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DETERIORATION OF LIMITS ON THE USE

OF FORCE AND ITS PERILS: A REJECTION
OF THE KOSOVO PRECEDENT
RONALD C. SANTOPADRE*

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Charter was designed to represent a

higher ideal.' Forged from the unprecedented destruction of the
Second World War, the Charter was created to restrict recourse
to the use of force in international affairs. 2 However, the
Charter's authority to restrain the use of force has been seriously
questioned. 3 Whereas human rights proponents once espoused
the progressive humanitarian ideals of the Charter, these same
advocates now reject its framework, grounded in the doctrine of

. J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2004; B.A., Fordham
University, 2001.
1 Michael J. Glennon, How War Left the Law Behind, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 2002, at
A37 (stating the Charter was designed to be above the political realm); see also S. James
Anaya, Essay, The Capacity of InternationalLaw to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights
Claims, 75 IOWA L. REV. 837, 837 (1990) (explaining that nondiscrimination ideals are
firmly embedded in the Charter).
2 The preamble to the U.N. Charter delineates the principles upon which it was
founded:
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime
has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small.
U.N. CHARTER pmbl. The drafters made the preservation of international peace and
security the first principle of the United Nations. Byron F. Burmester, Comment, On
HumanitarianIntervention: The New World Order and Wars to Preserve Human Rights,
1994 UTAH L. REV. 269, 274 (1994). For a discussion on the permissible uses of force
under the Charter, see Louis Henkin, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future
Developments in InternationalLaw, 60 ALB. L. REV. 571, 572 (1997).
3 See Glennon, supra note 1 (stating governments no longer consider the Charter's
provisions restricting the use of force binding); see also David Wippman, Change and
Continuity in Legal Justifications for Military Intervention in Internal Conflict, 27
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 435, 463 (1996) (noting legal scholars have been debating
whether the Security Council has exceeded its authority under the Charter in attempts to
reach international peace).

370

ST JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 18:1

sovereignty.4 On March 24, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization ("NATO") commenced a seventy-eight day bombing
campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY"),5
which had neither threatened nor attacked any member
country. 6 By this action, the 19 members of NATO fashioned a
new international legal precedent facilitating recourse to the use
of force without Security Council authorization. 7 Under the guise
of humanitarian intervention, 8 the war in Kosovo 9 has
4 See Linda A. Malone, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, 22 HOUS. J.
INT'L L. 585, 591 (2000) (stating support for human rights and antipathy towards
violence, once inextricably linked, no longer go hand in hand: today the hawks who
disregard the Charter's restrictions on force and support humanitarian intervention are
the former doves who favored the Charter's limits on the use of force).
5 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was formally dissolved in February of 2003 in
favor of the looser union of Serbia and Montenegro. Serbia Votes to End Yugoslavia, BBC
News, Jan. 28, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2hi/europe/2700243.stm (last
visited Aug. 26, 2003). Serbia consists of Serbia proper, Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija
(commonly referred to as "Kosovo"). Olivera Medenica, Protocol I and Operation Allied
Force: Did NATO Abide by Principlesof Proportionality?,23 LOy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 329, 331 n.10 (2001).
6 See Aaron Schwabach, The Legality of the Nato Bombing Operation in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 11 PACE INT'L L. REV. 405, 410 (1999) (discussing NATO's claim of
the collective right of anticipatory self-defense). The campaign against the FRY is
unprecedented in another sphere: not for NATO's stated humanitarian motives, but for its
military tactics. Extraordinarily, NATO sustained zero combat casualties during the
operation. The so-called "zero-casualty" war was an important feature in NATO's military
strategy. Avoiding causalities was primarily achieved through the use of high altitude
aerial bombing and the pledge not to use ground troops. These elements of the war will be
developed in greater depth below, in part V infra. NATO policy makers believed that a
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo would not be possible without popular support, and
this popular support for the war would be best sustained by avoiding a high casualty
combat situation on the ground in Kosovo. See David Wippman, Kosovo and the Limits of
International Law, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 129, 146 (2001). For a discussion on the
precision weaponry used and the little risk to NATO pilots, see Andreas Laursen, NATO,
the War Over Kosovo, and the ICTY Investigation, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 765, 766 (2002).
7 See Glennon, supra note 1, at A37. Glennon specifically noted the absence of Security
Council authorization for the war against Yugoslavia. For a discussion on the Charter's
limits, see Madeleine K. Albright, Enforcing International Law, 89 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 574, 575 (1995). Secretary Albright stated the role of the Security Council "lies near
the heart of international politics today." Id. Secretary Albright continued: "We are
privileged to live at a time when the enforcement of international standards of behavior
through the actions of the Security Council is more possible, widespread and varied than
it has ever been. It is also perhaps more necessary than it has ever been (emphasis
supplied)." Id. Despite her statement, Sec. Albright was one of the most vocal proponents
of waging war against Yugoslavia regardless of a lack of Security Council authorization.
8 See Andreas Laursen, NATO, the War Over Kosovo, and the ICTY Investigation, 17
Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 765, 766 (2002) (stating NATO's primary justification for the war was
on the grounds of humanitarian intervention); see also Medenica, supra note 5, at 348-49.
(defining humanitarian intervention as "the doctrine of using force against one state in
favor of the citizens of that state without the consent of its government"). Id. at 349. The
doctrine can be traced back to the seventeenth century to Hugo Grotius who argued that a
nation may intervene by the use of force in the affairs of another state to protect its
oppressed citizens. He contended that there is a common humanity that supercedes any
deference to national sovereignty. The doctrine fell into disfavor in the nineteenth century
with the rise of the nation state and appeared to be eradicated entirely with the creation
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essentially turned international law under the Charter on its
head. 10
Western leaders and many human rights advocates hailed
NATO's military action against the FRY as the dawn of a New
International Order, where antiquated notions of state
sovereignty would succumb to a higher value: the protection of
human rights.ll During the debate leading up to the war in Iraq,
American leaders have pointed to the Kosovo precedent as
sufficient international legal justification to initiate an attack.12
of the United Nations and the drafting of the U.N. Charter. Id. The NATO action poses
new questions about the desirability of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention for
contemporary human rights violations and the continued viability of the U.N.
international framework and the principle of sovereignty. Peter Ford, As Attack on Iraq
Begins, Question Remains: Is it Legal?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 21, 2003, at 5,
available at 2003 WL 5251739 (stating the Western powers continue to perceive the
Kosovo bombing as legal despite lacking Security Council backing because it was a
humanitarian intervention).
9 See Kosovo: Special Report, BBC News, available at http://news.bbc.co.ukhi/
englishlstatic/nato-gallery/air default.stm (last visited Aug. 26, 2003). See generally John
C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 167988 (2000) (analyzing Kosovo's impact on U.S. constitutional law and the War Powers Act).
In a joint resolution on April 28, 1999, the House of Representatives rejected by a vote of
427 to two declaring war on the FRY. The House then rejected a March 23 Senate
resolution that authorized President Clinton to use force by a 213-213 vote. Clinton based
his unilateral decision to attack the FRY on his "constitutional authority to conduct U.S.
foreign relations and as commander-in-chief and Chief Executive." Id.
10 See Glennon, supra note 1 (stating the Kosovo precedent has made it moot to seek
Security Council authorization for the use of force); see also Julie Mertus, The Imprint of
Kosovo on the Law of HumanitarianIntervention, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 527, 529
(2000) (stating that international law does not support the means of force selected in the
Kosovo campaign); Ved P. Nanda, NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo and
International Law, 10 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 1, 2 (1999/2000) (quoting Professor Bruno
Simma, who opines that "only a thin red line separates NATO's action on Kosovo from
international legality").
11 See Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International
Legitimation of Forcible HumanitarianCountermeasures in the World Community?, 10
EURO. J. INT'L L. 1, available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/vollO/Nol/com.html (last
modified May 11, 1999) (last visited Aug. 26, 2003) (emphasizing that Kosovo was a
desirable departure from international law and is justified on ethical grounds because it
would lead to a greater protection of human rights). Professor Cassese, Former President
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the
Presiding Judge, Trial Chamber II, of the ICTY, stated that Kant's prophecy that a
"cosmopolitan or world law" would one day emerge has become reality. Kant wrote that
"the narrower or wider community of all nations on earth has in fact progressed so far
that a violation of law and right in one place is felt in all others." Id. at n.4. Others have
speculated that the Kosovo intervention may set a new international norm as it
simultaneously breached current international law. See Jonathan I. Charney,
Anticipatory HumanitarianIntervention In Kosovo, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1231, 1242
(1999).
12 See Iraq Briefing, BBC News, availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle east/
2839695.stm (Mar. 11, 2003) (stating that although the U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan has stated war with Iraq would violate the U.N. Charter, the Americans and the
British have pointed to the Kosovo intervention as precedent to justify action in
contravention of the Charter); see also Hurst Hannum, Bellum Americanum, 27
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Security Council authorization has become an almost frivolous,
political act after Kosovo. 13 This note argues against further
deterioration of limits on the use of force, as embodied in the
U.N. Charter. Despite NATO's stated humanitarian purposes,
the Kosovo war must be judged by its overall impact on the longterm protection of human rights and its effect on the stability of
international affairs. The NATO bombing of the FRY did little to
advance the human rights of those living in Kosovo and in fact
caused massive destruction and the death of many civilians.14
The Kosovo precedent also seriously undermined the legitimacy
of the United Nations by setting a new standard whereby states
can resort to force outside the U.N. in an ad hoc, unprincipled
manner. 15 The lessons of Kosovo show the importance of
maintaining the integrity of the U.N. system as the foundation of
international political system.16
The raison d'etre of NATO's deployment of the latest precision
weaponry against the FRY was illuminated by Vaclav Havel, the
Czech President, in his proud statement to the Canadian Senate
and House of Commons. Kosovo, Havel declared, was "the first
war that has not been waged in the name of 'national interests,'
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 29, 29 (2003) (arguing Bush's rush into Iraq conflict was framed
by Clinton's policies in Kosovo).
13 See Hannum, supra note 12, at n.2, (stating that Secretary of State Colin Powell
explicitly mentioned in an October 2002 interview with National Public Radio that the
NATO bombing of the FRY is sufficient legal justification to bomb Iraq, even in the
absence of Security Council Authorization); see also Glennon, supra note 1 (noting Colin
Powell's response when asked if the Bush administration will seek Security Council
approval for an Iraq war: 'The president has authority, as do other like-minded nations,
just as we did in Kosovo"). See generally Suzanne Nossel, Battle Hymn of the Democrats,
27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 71, 75 (2003) (discussing how the NATO action in Kosovo
and the second Gulf war in Iraq have pushed the U.N. to sidelines).
14 See discussion infra Part V (detailing NATO's military campaign in Kosovo).
15 See Barry Schweid, U.S. Gets Scant New Support for Iraq War, A.P. ONLINE (Mar.
7, 2003) available at 2003 WL 14960993 (stating that White House spokesman Ari
Fleischer referred to the bombing of Yugoslavia as sufficient international legal precedent
for waging war on Iraq without Security Council backing); see also Yoo, supra note 9, at
1675-76 (2000) (stating that the Kosovo intervention will likely set the paradigm for
future uses of force). See generally Allan Gerson, Remarks at the Proceedings of the
Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 17,
1991) The Gulf War: Collective Security, War Powers and the Law of War, 85 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 1, 4 (1991) (stating the alternative to international law under the U.N.
Charter is an international system based on power politics); Andrew Sullivan, So Who
Exactly Did Start This War?, LONDON TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003, Sect. 4 (stating "the Clinton
administration also created the clear precedent for the war we are witnessing today:
Kosovo.. .the Kosovo campaign was the first and last test of a bizarre new world coalition,
the coalition that would collapse in the first two months of 2003").
16 See discussion infra Part V (noting results of military operations in Kosovo and
fallout surrounding these operations).
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but rather in the name of principles and values... [Yugoslav
President Slobodan] Milosevic does not threaten the territorial
integrity of any member of the alliance. And yet the alliance is at
war."1 7 For NATO, the war over Kosovo symbolized a new era
where states could no longer commit atrocities while hiding
behind their sovereignty.i 8 Although NATO leaders and human
rights activists applauded the war as the birth of this New World
Order, praise for the war was not universal.19 Opposition was
politically diverse, as questions surfaced over NATO's stated
humanitarian objectives. 2 0 Some notable opponents include
Patrick
Chomsky,22
Noam
Solzhenytsin, 2 1
Alexander
2 3 Harold Pinter 2 4 and Ramsey Clark. 2 5
Buchanan,
17 Richard A. Falk, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo, World Order, and the Future
of InternationalLaw, 93 AM. J. IN'L L. 847, 847-48 (1999). Havel went on to declare that
the world is witnessing "the end of the nation-state." He added that the "enlightened
efforts of generations of democrats, the terrible experience of two world wars... and the
evolution of civilization have finally brought humanity to the recognition that human
beings are more important than the state." NOAM CHOMSKY, THE NEW MILITARY
HUMANISM: LESSONS FROM KOSOVO 87-88 (1999).
18 See Edward D. Re, The Universal Declarationof Human Rights and the Domestic
Courts, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 585, 587 (1998) (stating that the "the very notion of the
existence of human rights of individuals necessarily implies a restriction or limitation
upon the sovereign power of states and governments"). Former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger observed:
Whatever one's view of the obsolescence of the doctrine of national sovereignty, the
combination of flagrant disregard of it by an alliance of democracies and its truculent
diplomacy amounted to a departure from the very international norms on which those
democracies has insisted throughout the Cold War.
HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY? TOWARD A DIPLOMACY FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 263 (2001). For a discussion of NATO's stated objectives in entering
Kosovo, see Hannum, supra note 13, at 31.
19 See e.g. PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE DEATH OF THE WEST 242 (2002) (stating,
"NATO has been converted into a neoimperialist bloc, which now asserts a sovereign right
to attack and invade small nations like Serbia in the name of democracy and human
rights); Kissinger, supra note 18, at 257 (explaining his reluctant support of the war not
for goals it embodied but rather fearing potential deleterious effects of military failure).
See generally Michael Mandel, Politics and Human Rights in InternationalCriminalLaw:
Our Case Against NATO and the Lessons to be Learned From It, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
95, 96 (2001) (stating Amnesty International found NATO to have committed war crimes).
20 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 100-01 (stating that the war's skeptics point to the
past military engagements of NATO countries, especially the United States, and find a
long history of interventionism that was not well-suited to protect civilian lives); see also
John J. Merriam, Kosovo and the Law of HumanitarianIntervention, 33 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 111, 152-53 (2001) (questioning international intervention for humanitarian
reasons, and problematic application of such efforts). See generally Wippman, supra note
6, at 135 (indicating interplay of humanitarian and U.N. Charter, implying Kosovo
conflict was situation where humanitarian efforts did not outweigh U.N. Charter values).
21 The famous Russian writer who survived imprisonment by the Soviets in the
Gulag.
22 An American linguist and political activist.
23 A senior advisor to Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan.
24 Preeminent British playwright. See Harold Pinter Takes on Nato, BBC NEWS,
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The most striking aspect of the Kosovo War is that the
bombing was most likely illegal under the current strictures of
international law. 2 6 There is no "humanitarian exception" for the
use of force under the U.N. Charter. 27 This realization has
produced a great divergence of opinion among international
lawyers and legal scholars about the desirability of NATO's
humanitarian intervention, despite its illegality. 2 8 Those in favor
of NATO's actions argue that the realities of the modern world
and humanity's greater concern for human rights have exposed
the deficiencies of the U.N. system, especially its monopoly on the
use of force and antiquated principles of sovereignty. 29 These

scholars state that international law has moved beyond the
norms exemplified by the U.N. Charter and should focus more on
the morality, rather than the legality of military action against
sovereign states. 3 0 On the other hand, many scholars reject
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/357999.stm
(June 1, 1999)
(explaining Harold Pinter's opposition to the war); Ann Talbot, PlaywrightHarold Pinter
Presents a Powerful Case in Opposition to NATO bombardment of Serbia, available at
http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/mayl999/pint-m07.shtml (May 7, 1999) (discussing
Pinter's comments on BBC television appearance).
25 A former U.S. Attorney General in the Johnson Administration and a human
rights lawyer. See generally Ian Williams, Ramsey Clark, the War Criminal'sBest Friend,
Salon.com available at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/1999/06/21/clark/ (June 21,
1999) (criticizing Clark's opposition to the Kosovo War); Letter from former Attorney
General Ramsey Clark to each member of the Security Council regarding the bombing of
Yugoslavia and Iraq available at http://www.iacenter.org/rkun4599.htm (Apr. 5, 1999)
(conveying to U.N. Security Council his anti-war position).
26 See discussion infra Part IV; see also Major Jeanne M. Meyer, Tearing Down the
Facade:A Critical Look at the Current Law on Targeting the Will of the Enemy and Air
Force Doctrine, 51 A.F.L. REV. 143, 177 (2001) (describing part of the NATO campaign as
"illegitimate"); Charles Tiefer, Recent Books on International Law: Book Reviews: Limits
of Law, Prerogativesof Power: Interventionism After Kosovo, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 489, 489
(2002) (book review) (arguing Kosovo action neither complied with the U.N. Charter nor
was approved by the Security Council).
27 See Charney, supra note 11, at 1235 (stating "humanitarian intervention is not an
exception to the Charter prohibitions on the use of force"); Mandel, supra note 19, at 109
(discussing provisions of U.N. Charter); see also Thomas M. Franck, When, If Ever, May
States Deploy Military Force Without Prior Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U.
J.L. & POLY 51, 58 (2001) (arguing the language of the U.N. Charter does not uphold a
humanitarian exception).
28 See discussion infra Part IV; see also Richard C. Hottelet, Ups and Downs in UN
History, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 17, 24 (2001) (stating the U.N.'s goal is to protect human
rights); Tiefer, supra note 26, at 489 (noting difference of interpreting U.N. Charter
among scholars).
29 See discussion infra Part IV; Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L
L. 1, 17 (1994) (commenting many of the policies promulgated by the U.N. are based on
concern for human rights); see also John B. Anderson, Global Governments and
Democratization, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 27, 31 (2001) (arguing the necessity of
reworking the U.N. structure).
30 See discussion infra Part IV; see also John Hazard, Book Review, International
Law and the InternationalSystem, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 187, 188 (1989) (observing U.N.

2003]

A REJECTION OFTHE KOSOVO PRECEDENT

NATO's actions solely because it bypassed international law. 3 1
According to the latter view, the U.N. Charter and principles of
state sovereignty are the widely accepted foundation of the
international system, and the morality of military force is no
32
substitution for its illegality.
Both of these views have merit, but ultimately, the greatest
danger rests in the abandonment of the U.N. system, despite
apparent deficiencies. 33 Although the Kantian notion of a
universal morality has gained widespread acceptance, 34 an
emotional response coupled with military force will not
necessarily provide a remedy to violations of human rights, and
may even exacerbate a humanitarian crisis. 3 5 As will be
should focus on morality).
31 Russia and China view the U.N. Security Council veto as a device to prevent U.S.
hegemony. Falk, supra note 17, at 850. Some scholars see the U.N. as the only equalizing
factor that weak and poor nations have. Thomas M. Franck, Of Gnats and Camels: Is
There a Double Standard at the United Nations, AM. J. INT'L L. 811, 831 (1984). While
Western countries can rely on their economic and military dominance, poor countries will
fear any contravention of the U.N. Id. Some commentators have noted that although
humanitarian intervention may be illegal, support of the theory has been growing.
Charney, supra note 11, at 1242.
32 See discussion infra Part IV (noting that involvement may be necessary to prevent
continued violation of human rights); see also Lesile A. Burton, Kosovo: To Bomb or Not to
Bomb? The Legality is the Question, 7 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 49, 59 (2001) (arguing
that since WWII, international law has developed to allow the use of force to prevent
human rights violations); Falk, supra note 17, at 850 (discussing theory that NATO's
action was necessary to prevent further human rights violations).
33 See discussion infra Part V (discussing harms inflicted during the Kosovo
campaign); Louis Henkin, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of
"HumanitarianIntervention," 93 AM.J. INT'L L. 824, 828 (stating "Kosovo demonstrates
yet again a compelling need to address the deficiencies in the law and practice of the
U.N."); see also Thomas A. Geraci, Book Review, The Gulf War. The Origins and
Implications of the Iran-Iraq Conflict, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 189, 190 (1993) (arguing that the
U.N. was unsuccessful during the Gulf War).
34 The Kantian view asserts that violations of human rights in one place are felt in all
others. Malone, supra note 4, at 591. Kant also espoused the view that good intentions
should frame all actions. James Macdonald & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, A Natural Law
Defense to the Employment Law Question: A Reponse to Richard Epstein, 38 AM. BUS. L.J.
363, 401 (2001). However, he asserted that whatever is correct for one society, may not be
correct for all. Heather Leawoods, Gustav Radbruch:An ExtraordinaryLegal Philosopher,
2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 489, 504 (2000).
35 See Jonathan Marcus, BBC News, Nato's Incomplete Victory, available at
(Mar. 16, 2000) (stating that
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/671432.stm
regardless of the military outcome of the war in Kosovo, it was a moral victory for the
Europeans to simply take action in lieu of its inaction in Bosnia); see also Gordon B.
Baldwin, Book Review, Broken Chain of Being: James Brown Scott and the Origins of
Modern InternationalLaw, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 433, 433 (2000) (arguing the proponents of
the use of force to defuse human rights violations have not effectively formulated
appropriate boundaries for such intervention). See generally William Bradford, "With a
Very Great Blame on Our Hearts: Reparations,Reconciliations, and an American Indian
Ple for Peace and Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 1-3 (2002) (noting the U.S. has
increased its policy of intervention post September 11).
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illustrated, NATO's bombing of the FRY illustrates all of the
unforeseen and inadvertent dangers that inevitably go hand in
hand with the use of military force. 36 Instead, NATO could have
offered more lenient peace terms - which NATO ultimately did
after the bombing - before making the decision to go to war in
order to get an immediate peacekeeping force on the ground in
Kosovo.
Finally, even if NATO's intentions were genuinely
humanitarian in nature, the military methods employed by
NATO neutralized any success the operation may have
accomplished. 3 7
I. THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
The United Nations is the undisputed source of contemporary
international law. 3 8 The U.N. Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights are universally considered the
foundation of the international order and the primary documents
ensuring the protection of human rights. 39 The U.N. Charter and
all Security Council decisions are considered a "higher law" 40 and
36 See discussion infra Part V (discussing the unintended consequences of the Kosovo
War); see also Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. WIlliard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence
and Human Rights Abuses in International Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of
Human Dignity, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 316, 316-17 (1999) (remarking intervention may
actually extend human rights violations). See generally Christine M. Chinkin, Book
Review, Human Rights in Global Politics, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 472, 476 (2001) (noting that
there are many consequences which arise after the decision to intervene is made).
37 See discussion infra Part V (arguing NATO could have tailored its operations to
avoid damage and death to the civilian population); see also Charney, supra note 11, at
1247 (asserting Kosovo campaign was not tailored to protect ethnic Albanians in the
country); Christine M. Chinkin, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo: A "Good" of "Bad"
War?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 841, 841-42 (1999) (discussing affects of NATO bombing on the
civilian population).
38 See Bruno Simma, NATO's Future "Strategic Concept": From "Out of Area" to "Out
of Treaty'?, EURO. J. INT'L L., available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Voll0/Nol/abl3.html#Heading3 (last modified April 26, 1999) (stating that the Charter is comparable to
a Constitution of the international community); see also Charney, supra note 11, at 1240
(noting the U.N. Charter restricts countries from pursuing use of force); Frederic L.
Kirgis, Jr., Armed Intervention in Haiti, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. NEWSL., Sept. 1994 (noting
the power of the U.N. in international relations).
39 See Re, supra note 19, at 586 (arguing the formulation of the U.N. Charter and
Declaration of Human Rights were fundamental developments in human rights
international law); see also Elizabeth F. Defeis, Minority Protectsion and Bilateral
Agreements: An Effective Mechanism, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 291, 293 (1999)
(noting the U.N. Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights are the backbone of
international human rights law); Fergus MacKay, Universal Rights or a Universe Unto
Itself? Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights and the World Bank's Draft OperationalPolicy
4.10 on Indigenous Peoples, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 527, 572 (2002) (analyzing importance
of U.N. Charter on international rights).
40 See Bruno Simma, The Threat or Use of Force in InternationalLaw, EURO. J. INT'L
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override any inconsistent treaties made by U.N. member states, 4 1
regardless of their date of inception. 4 2 The U.N. Charter is a jus
cogens norm, accepted by the international community, from
3
which no derogation is allowed.4
The U.N. Charter was created as a response to the destruction
of World War 1J.44 The drafters of the Charter, in an effort to
avoid future international hostilities among nations, sought to
restrain the future use of force.45 As a result, the primary
purpose of the U.N. is to encourage "the peaceful settlement of
international disputes and to rely on the military instrument of
L., available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/VollO/Nol/abl- l.html (last modified April 26,
1999) (emphasizing the power of U.N. Charter and Security Council in international law);
see also Daniel Bodansky, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 597 (1999) (noting the power of the
Security Council). But see Major Christopher M. Supernor, InternationalBounty Hunters
for War Criminals: Privatizingthe Enforcement of Justice, 50 A.F.L. REV. 215, 215 (2001)
(stating that many do not value international law because of the inability to effectively
enforce such law).
41 See U.N. CHARTER art. 103 (explaining that the obligations under the Charter will
supersede any other agreements between member states); see also Gordon A. Christenson,
Federal Courts and World Civil Society, 6 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 405, 505
(1997) (noting that the U.N. Charter creates an obligation to adhere to Security Council
decisions); Geoffrey R. Watson, The Death of Treaty, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 781, 818-19 (1994)
(commenting that the U.N. Charter duties override all other pre-existing treaties).
42 Article 103 of the UN Charter states: "[11n the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail." U.N. CHARTER art. 103. The date of inception of a pre-existing
treaty is irrelevant due to the fact that the U.N. Charter prevails regardless of a prior
date of inception. Charney, supra note 11, at 93. In fact, the U.N. Charter's principles
supersede any other type of international agreement. Simon J. Lincoln, Note, The Legal
Status of Gibraltar:Whose Rock Is It Anyway?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 285, 322 (1994).
43 See Sherylynn Fiandaca, In vitro Fertilization and Embryos: The Need for
International Guidelines, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 337, 396 (1998) (noting that all
principles embedded in the U.N. Charter are accepted as jus cogens norm); Simma, supra
note 40 (explaining jus cogens to mean a norm which is accepted by the entire
interational community); see also Patrick Del Duca, Gli Accordi Internationali
Confliggenti, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 410, 412 (1989) (clarifying that even the Vienna
Convention announced that the U.N. Charter as ajus cogens norm).
44 See Burmester, supra note 2, at 274 (stating the maintenance of peace and security
was the first principle of the United Nations); Henkin, supra note 2, at 572 (noting that
the U.N. Charter and its accompanying law was established immediately proceeding
World War II); see also Vijayashri Sripati, Toward Fifty Years of Constitutionalism and
FundamentalRights in India: Looking Back to See Ahead (1950-2000), 14 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 413, 459 (1998) (commenting that it was due to the human rights violations in World
War II which gave birth to the United Nations).
45 See Burmester, supra note 2, at 274 (commenting that one of the principles behind
the U.N. Charter was a restraint on the use of force); Todd A. Morth, Note, Considering
Our Position: Viewing Information Warfare as Use of Force Prohibited by Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter, 30 CASE W. RE. J. INT'L L. 567, 587-88 (1998) (clarifying the basic
premise of the U.N. Charter is to restrain the use of force); see also Michael J. Glennon,
The New Interventionism; The Search for a Just International Law, FOREIGN AFF.,
May/June 1999, at 2 (describing the drafters' intent in establishing the U.N. Charter, as a
response to World War II in order to limit the use of force).

378

ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 18:1

policy only as an extreme last resort."46 In order to effectuate this
principle, the U.N. allocated all non-defensive uses of force to the
Security Council.47
There are two exceptions to the U.N.'s prohibition of the threat
or use of force: the right of self-defense under Article 51 and
enforcement actions under Chapter VII.48 Article 51 permits the
use of force if an attack is directed against a Member state. This
right to use force for self-defense is an "inherent right"4 9 and can
be exercised even in the absence of Security Council
authorization.D0 The second situation where the use of force is
permitted is Chapter VII. Chapter VII authorizes the U.N. to
employ force against an aggressor state if the Security Council
determines that there is a threat to peace and all peaceful means
to resolve the dispute have been exhausted.D1 Only at this point
46 Medenica, supra note 5, at 347 (quoting the Preamble of the U.N. Charter).
47 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (stating that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations."); Falk, supra notel7, at 852 (pointing out that the structure of the
Charter grants the five permanent members of the Security Council with a right to veto
any use of force); see also Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council:
Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Firesand The Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93
AM. J. INTL L. 124, 124 (1999) (noting that the Security Council is viewed as authorizing
the use of force, not as a device to limit such use).
48 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 345-46 (noting the there are two separate
authorizations for the use of force under the U.N. Charter); Sean D. Murphy,
ContemporaryPracticeof the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 161, 163-64 (1999) (explaining that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter allows a member
state to use force in self-defense); see also Patricia Y. Reyhan, Conceptualizing Violence:
Present and Future Developments in InternationalLaw: Panel II: Adjudicating Violence:
Problems Confronting InternationalLaw and Policy on War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity: Genocidal Violence in Burundi: Should InternationalLaw Prohibit Domestic
HumanitarianIntervention?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 771, 793 (1997) (discussing the exception
within the U.N. Charter to use force for self defense).
49 U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (stating that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations,"). See Tom J. Farer, Beyond the Charter Frame:
Unilateralismor Condominium?, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 359 (2002) (emphasizing that the
Article 51 of U.N. Charter affirms the "inherent right of self-defense"); Maj. Robert A.
Ramey, Armed Conflict on the FinalFrontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1,
60 (2000) (commenting that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter secures the "inherent right" of
self-defense).
50 See Richard J. Grunawalt, The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge
Advocate's Primer, 42 A.F. L. REV. 245, 251 n.18 (1997) (noting that Article 51, itself,
states that "nothing... shall impair the inherent right of... self-defense"); Medenica,
supra note 5, at 345 (discussing that such an inherent right of self-defense does not
require Security Council approval); see also Maj. Christopher M. Petras, "Space Force
Alpha" Military Use of International Space Station and the Concept of "Peaceful
Purposes" 53 A.F. L. REV. 135, 176 (2002) (commenting that the inherent right of selfdefense is "customary international law").
51 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 345 (stating that Chapter VII grants the United
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can the Security Council authorize military force under Article
42.52 Therefore, any threat or use of force that is not justified as a
measure of self-defense or as a Security Council authorization is
a violation of international law under the framework of the U.N.
5
Charter. 3

A. Tension Between The Protection of Human Rights and State
Sovereignty in the Charter System

Because the U.N. Charter system was primarily formulated to
restrain the use of force, a fundamental contradiction emerges
between the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' guarantees
and the U.N. Charter's restriction on the use of force.54 It is from
this tension that NATO legitimized the use of force against the

Nations authority to intervene if these two conditions are met); Daphna Shraga, U.N.
Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and
Responsibility for Operation-RelatedDamage, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 406, 409 (2000) (noting
that the use of force is permitted pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter); see also
Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the InternationalLaw of Radio Jamming,
91 AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 647 (1997) (clarifying that Chapter VII permits the use of force
when there are threats to "international peace and security"').
52 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (stating that the Security Council "may take such action
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security"); Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute
Establishing an International Criminal Court: Is the Court's Jurisdiction Truly
Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?,35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 37 (2001)
(explaining that if Security Council authorizes the use of force under Article 51, it may do
so pursuant to Article 42 by almost any means necessary to regain international peace);
see also Rosemary E. Libera, Note, Divide Conquer, and Pay: Civil Compensation for
Wartime Damages, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 291, 293-94 (2001) (discussing the
applicable provisions under Chapter VII for the U.N. to authorize force, most notably
Article 42).
53 See Simma, supra note 40, at 1 (concluding that illegal use of force by any member
state that does not fall within the justification of the U.N. Charter is a breach of
international law). See generally David P. Fidler, War, Law & Liberal Thought: The Use of
Force in the Reagan Years, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 45, 47 (1994) (noting that the use
of force without justification is a violation of jus cogens or an internationally accepted
norm); Timothy L.H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson, The International Law
Commission's Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind: An
Appraisal of the Substantive Provisions, 5 CRIM. L.F. 1, 28-29 (1994) (commenting that
threats of the the use of force, not only the use of force, is also a violation of international
law and against the U.N. Charter).
54 Chomsky, supra note 17, at 73 (stating that although the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights protects individual rights, it contains no enforcement mechanism). See
generally Kofi Oteng Kufuor, The OAU and the Recognition of Governments in Africa:
Analyzing Its Practice and Proposalsfor the Future, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 369, 393-94
(2002) (noting the main purpose of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to give
"recognition of fundamental human rights"); Maj. Lisa L. Turner & Maj. Lynn G. Norton,
Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 A.F. L. REV. 1, 75-76 (2001) (discussing the
Declaration of Human Rights as affording humane treatment for "all people at all times
and in all locations").
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FRY, as embodied in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. 55
The Charter system preserves states' territorial integrity yet, at
the same time, there are crimes that transcend the inviolability
of national sovereignty. 56 Conflict between the U.N.'s dual
objectives arises when a dictator deprives his own people of their
fundamental rights. 57 The NATO action exposed this tension and
the difficulties in reconciling these two important principles. 58 In
Kosovo, NATO faced a legal and moral dilemma between the
prohibitions of the use of force and the duty to protect human
rights. 59
Although the Charter is concerned with both human rights and
security, 60 it was primarily enacted to ensure international peace
55 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 73 (discussing humanitarian intervention in terms
of the use of force by NATO against FRY); see also Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional
and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 757, 768 (2001) (commenting that due to NATO's intervention against FRY
unilateral humanitarian intervention may be established as a right). See generally George
K. Walker, Principlesfor Collective HumanitarianIntervention to Succor Other Countries'
Imperiled Indigenous Nationals, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 35, 37-38 (2002) (defining
humanitarian intervention as "the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or
international organization primarily for protecting nationals of the affected state from
widespread deprivations of human rights or rights under humanitarian law").
56 See Schwabach, supra note 6, at 417 (stating "there are some crimes that transcend
the inviolability of nation states"); see also Lori Lyman Bruun, Note, Beyond the 1948
Convention -Emerging Principles Of Genocide In Customary InternationalLaw, 17 MD. J.
INT'L L. & TRADE 193, 219 (1993) (noting that interventions are permissible in response to
violations of international law); Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Note, Rethinking Genocidal
Intent: The Case for Knowledge-Based Interpretation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2259, 2260
(1999) (discussing genocide as transcending a state's sovereignty).
57 See Burmester, supra note 2, at 275 (stating "a conflict between the U.N.'s dual
objectives thus arises when a ruler deprives its own citizens of fundamental human
rights"); see also Bartram S. Brown, The Protection Of Human Rights In Disintegrating
States: A New Challenge, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 203, 209 (1992) (discussing the UN
tension between intervention and sovereignty); Jost Delbruck, A Fresh Look At
HumanitarianIntervention Under The Authority Of The United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887,
892 (1992) (noting the conflict between the need to prevent human rights violations and
refraining from interfering in domestic affairs of a nation).
58 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 73 (stating that perhaps this tension is an outright
contradiction); Nanda, supra note 10, at 2 (outlining argument that balance needed to be
struck between NATO's "illegal" use of force and need for humanitarian intervention); see
also Falk, supra note 17, at 850 (noting that only effective humanitarian intervention
seemed to violate the UN Charter).
59 See Charney, supra note 11, at 1232-33 (noting that the world has an obligation to
prevent human rights violations); Nanda, supra note 10, at 1 (stating that NATO action
may have been in violation of international law); see also Michael E. Smith, NATO, the
Kosovo Liberation Army, and the War for an Independent Kosovo: Unlawful Aggression or
Legitimate Exercise of Self-Determination, 2001 ARMY LAW. 1, 1 (2001) (writing about
majority view that humanitarian intervention violates UN Charter).
60 The preamble to the U.N. Charter states that its founding principle was "to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought
untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of
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and security in the aftermath of World War 11.61 To perpetuate
the furtherance of international peace at the expense of other
values, any enforcement of human rights by the use of force is
always subject to Article 2(4),62 the fundamental rule from which
any inquiry on the use of force proceeds. 63 Thus, unless the use of
force to protect human rights can fit into one of the two
exceptions under the Charter, 6 4 an oppressed group is essentially
left with an unenforceable guarantee of fundamental human
rights under the Declaration. NATO claimed to have adhered to
the spirit of the U.N. in a moral sense, but it did not follow the
Charter's mechanisms for the use of force in the legal sense
because they bypassed the Security Council in their deployment
of the use of force. 65 In effect, NATO reconciled this tension on
nations large and small." U.N. CHARTER pmbl. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to
Reform the United Nations: Lessons From the InternationalEconomic Maw Revolution, 2
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 185, 187 (1997) which notes the UN Charter's concern for
human rights. For a further look at the purposes of the UN Charter, see generally
Richard A.C. Cort, Note, Resettlement of Refuges: National or InternationalDuty?, 32 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 307, 312 (1997).
61 See John B. Anderson, The UN and the Protection of Human Rights: Global
Governments and Democratization,5 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol'y 27, 29 (2001) (noting that the
UN was established to prevent conflict after WWII); James Robert Burk, Note, Warning:
The Food You Are About to Consume May (Or May Not) Be Harmful to Your Health, 15
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 183, 190 (1998) (stating "the UN was established after
WWII to ensure worldwide peace and security"); Karen Tyler Farr, Note, A New Global
Environmental Organization,28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 493, 496 (2000) (asserting that
the UN was created to remedy human rights violations in light of the League of Nations
failure to prevent WWI1).
62 See Davis Brown, The Role of Regional OrganizationsIn Stopping Civil Wars, 41
A.F.L. REV. 255, 267 (1997) (noting that article 2(4) forbids any intervention); Thomas M.
Franck, The UN and the Protection of Human Rights: When, If ever, May States Deploy
Military Force Without Prior Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y
51, 51 (interpreting article 2(4) as requiring states not only to renounce war but all forms
of interstate violence); John Norton Moore, Granadaand the InterstateDouble Standard,
78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145, 153 (1984) (arguing that article 2(4) "seeks to end the aggressive
use of force in international relations").
63 See W. Michael Reisman, Note, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing
CharterArticle 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642, 642 (1984) (noting Article 2(4) represents the
UN principle against unilateral force by states in its most authoritative form). See
generally Thomas Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 839,
839 (2001) (placing Article 2(4) as primary obstacle for U.S. unilateral action); Lobel,
supra note 47, at 125, (using article 2 (4) as starting point for discussion).
64 See Jonathan I. Charney & J.R.V. Prescott, Resolving Cross-Strait Relations
between China and Taiwan, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 453, 477 (2000) (noting single exception to
article 2(4) is the right of self defense); John H. McNeill, Book Review, War Aggression
and Self-Defense. By Yoram Dinstein, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 305, 305 (1990) (noting that the
author argues an implied exception to article 2(4) for humanitarian intervention). See
generally Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore
Democracy:InternationalLegal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone,
14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321, 339 (1998) (arguing exceptions to article 2(4) leave it open to
abuse).
65 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 329-30 (noting NATO bypassed the UN Security
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the side of protecting human rights at the expense of legality.
Scholars have argued that NATO's resolution of this conflict, by
favoring the protection of human rights over state sovereignty,
has led to a new era in international affairs; an era in which the
66
traditional notions of sovereign immunity play no part.

II. THE Kosovo CRISIS
The NATO intervention cannot be understood without placing
it in its larger historical context. 6 7 Yugoslavia, and the Balkans
in general, are no strangers to war. 68 The conflicting religious
and historical backgrounds of those living in the region have
created a chronic state of ethnic tension which has resulted in
bloodshed dating far back into historical memory.6 9 Kosovo, in
particular, has been a particularly important region in the
tension of the Balkans. To the Serbs, Kosovo is of symbolic
importance because it is the site where the Ottoman Empire
defeated the Serbian Army in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389.70
Council during intervention in Kosovo); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 631 (1999) (discussing
NATO authorization not clarified with UN Charter system); Smith, supra note 59, at 21
(discussing NATO's justifications to intervene without Security Council authorization).
66 See Nanda, supra note 10, at 16-17 (noting troubling questions raised by NATO
intervention in Kosovo without Security Council authorization). Compare Glennon, supra
note 46, at 2 (arguing new rules on interventionism marks failure of UN to ensure peace
and decline in idea of sovereign equality) with Thomas M. Frank, Sidelined in Kosovo?;
The United Nations Demise Has Been Exaggerated;Break It, Don't Fake It, FOR. AFFAIRS,
July/Aug. 1999, at 116 (responding to Glennon's argument).
67 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 331 (opining that the breakup of Yugoslavia was
the product of centuries of dramatic events); Gerald G. Howard, Note, Combat in Kosovo:
Ignoring The War Powers Resolution, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 261, 264 (2001) (summarizing the
regional history of Kosovo); see also Sarah Aird, Kosovo: History of a Human Rights
Crisis, 6 HuM. RTS. BR. 30, 30 (1999) (providing a history of the human rights crisis).
68 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 331 (stating that the seeds of the immediate conflict
grew from events in the early 1990's). See generally Aird, supra note 67, at 30 (discussing
history of conflict in Kosovo); Howard, supra note 67, at 264 (discussing the conflict in the
early 1990's).
69 See Robert W. Stannard, The Laws of War: An Examination of NATO's Intervention
in the Former Yugoslavia and the Role of the European Court of Human Rights in
Redressing Claims for Civilian Casualties in War, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 617, 617-18
(2002) (discussing Yugoslavia as land of constant conflict for most of recorded history); see
also Medenica, supra note 5, at 331 (noting the present conflict in Kosovo has been the
result of centuries of conflict); US-NATO Bombs Fall on Serbia: The "New World Order"
Takes Shape, World Socialist Web Site, at http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/mar1999/
nato-m25.shtml (Mar. 25, 1999) (rejecting the view that the Kosovo crisis can be reduced
to the evil of Milosevic because complex historical and political forces were at work in
Kosovo).
70 See William Miller, Slobodan Milosevic's Prosecution by the InternationalCriminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Harbinger of Things to Come for International
Criminal Justice, 22 LOy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 553, 560-61 (2000) (arguing ethnic
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Although historically ethnic Serbian, in recent years Kosovo has
become predominantly populated by ethnic Albanians. 71 Under
the communist leader Josep Broz Tito, Albanians enjoyed
2
significant autonomy and economic and social independence.7
The death of Tito in 1980, the rise of Milosevic, and nationalism
increased tensions in the province. 7 3 Albanian dissatisfaction and
protests led to harassment and reprisals against the Serbs living
74
within Kosovo.
In 1989, on the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, the then
Serbian President Milosevic called for the relinquishment of
Kosovo's autonomous status. 75 Later that year, Serbia's National
Assembly centralized control over the province in Belgrade
through a series of amendments to the Serbian Constitution. 76
conflict began in 14th century with Serbian defeat at the hands of the Turks); see also
Michael Kelly, Traveling the Road to Rambouillet: Is the Imposition of Federalism in
Kosovo PragmaticForeign Policy or Unwise Meddling?, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 789, 791 (1999)
(noting Turkish victory at Battle of Kosovo). See generally Aird, supra note 67, at 30
(examining the origin of Kosovo conflict with the Battle of Kosovo).
71 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 332-34 (discussing the ethnic composition of
Kosovo); John R.G. Vought, Republican Neo-Isolationists a Threat, LAS VEGAS REV. J.,
Dec. 26, 1994, at lB (establishing that "Kosovo [is] uneasily governed by the Yugoslav
Serbs from Belgrade, but populated by an overwhelming Albanian majority"); Will Kosovo
Also Be Sacrificed to the Serbs?, 20 CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 20, 1994, (stating that
Serbian-occupied Kosovo is 95% ethnic Albanian).
72 Medenica, supra note 5, at 333 (stating that under Tito, Albanians were able to
fulfill their social and economic potential); see Robert J. White, Indonesia Could Be the
Next Yugoslavia, STAR. TRIB., Mar. 23, 1995, at 15A (commenting on authoritarian regime
as "improv[ing] the economy"); Peace Can Come to Bosnia but Causes Must Be
Understood, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Dec. 13, 1995, atD10 (stating that Tito "maintain[ed]
a secular government in which all groups are equal").
73 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 333 (stating that regional instability followed Tito's
death); see also Jackson Diehl, Yugoslavia Facing More Big Changes, HOUS. CHRON., Oct.
9, 1988, at 31 (commenting on the instability that followed Tito's death); Save
Croatia!United Nations Must Stop the Slaughter, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Nov. 14, 1991,
at A12 (suggesting that it was expected that Yugoslavia would disintegrate after Tito's
death).
74 Medenica, supra note 5, at 333 (commenting on the conflict between two groups);
Will Kosovo Also Be Sacrificed to the Serbs?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 20, 1994, at
20 (noting the possibility of a conflict between Serbs and Albans in Kosovo); Recognizing
Croatia and Slovenia, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1991, at A12 (observing the difficulty
between Albanians and Serbs as the former seeks independence from the latter).
75 See Wilbur G. Landrey, In Yugoslav Breakup, There is Plenty of Blame to Go
Around, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 27, 1991, at 2A (noting dissolution of the Albanian
assembly of Kosovo in an attempt to suppress the Albanian majority in the region). See
generally Chomsky, supra note 17, at 27 (stating that popular Serbian support for
Milosevic stemmed from his hard-line stance promising to ensure the protection of the
Serb minority living in Kosovo); Yugoslavia's Unity, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, Dec. 31,
1990, at 20 (stating that Milosevic "refuses to negotiate" for Albanian independence).
76 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 334-35 (discussing the actions of the Assembly); see
also Blaine Harden, Milosevic Unlikely to Relinquish Power Gently, WASH. POST, Oct. 21,
1992, at A30 (stating that "Serbian constitution was rewritten to disenfranchise ethnic
Albanians"). See generally Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An
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These emergency measures included detentions, curfews, and the
deployment of federal troops into the province. 7 7 In September of
1990 the Albanian-controlled Assembly of Kosovo defiantly
adopted its own Constitution and essentially created a parallel
government to Belgrade's. 78 In September of 1991, the Kosovar
Parliament passed the "Resolution on Independence and
Sovereignty of Kosovo," which was approved in a secret
referendum by almost 100% of the vote. 79 A month later, the
Assembly declared Kosovo's independence from the FRY, which
Albania immediately recognized.8 0 In 1992, Ibrahim Rugova was
elected president of the Republic of Kosovo with 99.5% of the
vote.8 1 In the following years Western attention was mostly
focused on the fighting in Bosnia, but the same forces of
nationalism and ethnic tension present in Bosnia were brewing
in Kosovo.S2

Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 464 (1991) (discussing the background of political
trends in Eastern Europe and the specific acts taken in Serbia).
77 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 334-35 (discussing the measures taken by the
Assembly); Night Curfew Imposed in Yugoslav Province, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 22,
1990, at 7A (reporting on the curfews imposed in the conflict region); Yugoslavia Sets
Curfew in Kosovo Ethnic strife: Tanks patrol the streets of the province to prevent clashes
between Albanians and Serbians, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1990, at 6 (stating that government
of Yugoslavia imposed curfews "to defend the constitutional order and prevent violence").
78 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 26-27 (stating the Constitution sought to resolve
Kosovo's status in the framework of the FRY). See generally Dusko Doder, Serb Chief
Ousts Yugoslav Rival: Ruling Group Won't Recognize Move, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 19, 1991, at 4
(describing the conflict as it unfolded); Landrey, supra note 75, at 2A (portraying the
tragic conflict in Yugoslavia).
79 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 26-27 (stating the West had just recognized the
independence of Slovenia and Croatia, giving Kosovo hope for its own state); Murray
Dubin, Yugoslav, Albanian Teen-agers in Michigan Copy Ethnic War, HOUS. CHRON., Oct.
27, 1991 (referring to the Kosovar declaration of independence); Albania Recognizes
'Independent' Kosovo, WASH. TIMES , Oct. 23, 1991, at A2 (stating that "[t]he Albanian
parliament ... recognized the sovereign and independent republic of Kosovo").
80 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 26-27 (stating that Kosovo Albanians signed a
declaration embodying their will to unite all Albanians in a Greater Albania). See
generally Bujar Bukoshi, Serbia's Next Victim, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1992, at A23 (stating
that Kosovo "voted overwhelmingly for independence in September 1991"); Jonathan
Kaufman, Serb Challenger Says He's Forced a Runoff, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 21, 1992
(acknowledging Kosovo's declaration of independence).
81 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 27 (stating Rugova's party, The Democratic League
of Kosovo (LDK) won 75% of the parliamentary seats). See generally Medenica, supra note
5, at 335 (acknowledging Rugova's victory); Thorn Shanker, Yugoslavia to Reopen
Albanians' Schools, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 30, 1992 (referring to Rugova as president).
82 See generally Medenica, supra note 5, at 335 (discussing the ethnic conflict); Mark
J. Porubcansky, Peace at Last Coming to Bosnia, But New Conflicts Are Lurking,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Mar. 20, 1994, at A8 (referring to the ethnic and national tension
in the region); The Bosnian Burden, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1994, at 15 (stating that conflict
in Bosnia could trigger tension in Kosovo).
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The Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA") first emerged in 1996.83
The KLA, a guerilla unit of Albanian fighters committed to
attacking Yugoslav forces,8 4 drew support from the growing
frustration with Rugova's pacifist strategies and demanded
immediate rights for Albanians by any means possible.8 5
Although KLA operations were initially focused on Yugoslav
Security forces, by February 1998, Serbian civilians became a
legitimate target in their campaign to defy Belgrade.8 6 In
response, Serb forces stepped up security measures in the
province. 8 7 The U.N. Security Council intervened in March
1998.88

83 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 335 (discussing the creation of the KLA). But see
Chomsky, supra note 17, at 28-29 (noting, however, that the roots of the KLA can be
traced back to 1991, when a few Kosovan clans and radicals in the Albanian diaspora
linked together). See generally Lewis Dolinsky, Notes from Here and There, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 20, 1996, at A14 (describing the nature of army's activities).
84 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 335 (noting that the KLA's first armed attack
against Federal Yugoslav forces came in 1993, when they killed two and wounded five
Serb police officers; see also Chomsky, supra note 17, at 29 (discussing the nature of the
group's activities); James Green, Albanians Attack Serbian Targets, 29 JANE'S DEFENCE
WKLY., Sept. 4, 1996 (describing the violent means used by the group).
85 See Ljubomir Milasin, Serbs Kill 30 Kosovo Albanians, While Gunman Kills Four
Serbs, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Dec. 14, 1998 (noting the differences between violent KLA
and moderate Rugova); see also Chomsky, supra note 17, at 28-29 (blaming Washington
for not including Kosovo in the Dayton peace accord, which created conditions upon which
radical Albanian forces would feel compelled to turn to violence to reach their goals). See
generally Gillian Sandford, Lessons of Bosnia Loom Over Countdown to Kosovo,
EUROPEAN, Oct. 12, 1998 (presenting an account of the conflict).
86 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 97 (stating that the U.N. Security Council and
independent observers accused the KLA of terrorism and stated that they instigated the
increased violence and reprisals by Serb forces); see also Medenica, supra note 5, at 336,
384-85 (stating that the United States also regarded the KLA as a terrorist organization,
although they would later supply them with close air support against Serb forces). See
generally Kissinger, supra note 18, at 262 (noting Kissinger's observation that the KLA
was not an ordinary political movement struggling for autonomy, and has been described
as a terrorist group).
87 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 336 (stating that KLA guerilla attacks provoked
reprisals by Serbian police against civilians suspected of supporting the guerillas). See
generally Falk, supra note 17, at 849 (noting harsh Serb security measures); H.B.
McCullough, International Law Weekend Proceedings: Intervention in Kosovo: Legal?
Effective?, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 299, 300 (2001) (discussing the rationale for harsh
Serb security measures).
88 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 336-37 (stating that the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1160 in March 1998, which called upon both parties to immediately work
towards a political solution or face considerable additional measures); see also Ved P.
Nanda, Holland and Hart Private International Law Award: Self-Determination and
Succession Under International Law, 29 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305, 319 (2001)
(explaining Resolution 1160 and its emphasis on the making of a constructive peaceful
resolution); Ruth Wedgewood, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: NATO's Campaign in
Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 829 (1999) (noting that Resolution 1160 imposed an
arms embargo).
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A. U.N. Involvement in Kosovo

In March 1998 the Security Council passed Resolution 1160,89
which called for the FRY and Albanians in Kosovo to reach a
political solution and placed an arms embargo on both sides. 9O
Despite these measures, by the summer of 1998, the KLA
launched offensives by which they took control of 40% of Kosovo;
Serb forces reacted with a major military offensive inside the
province. 9 1 Serb tactics included killings, torture, burning
Kosovan villages and expelling residents. 92 As the situation
worsened, the Security Council adopted Resolution 119993 in
September 1998 declaring that the conditions in Kosovo were "a
threat to peace and security in the region." 94 The Security
Council demanded a ceasefire, an end to hostilities, and that the
parties take steps to negotiate with international participation. 95
89 See S.C. Res 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3868 mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160
(1998).
90 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 384-85 (stating the Resolution also warned that the
Security Council would pursue additional measures if there is no peaceful solution of the
parties' differences); see also Randy W. Stone, Comment, Protecting Civilians During
Operation Allied Force: The Enduring Importance of the Proportional Response and
NATO's Use of Armed Force in Kosovo, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 501, 518 (2001) (noting that
the Resolution called upon the parties to use meaningful dialogue to reach a political
solution); Wippman, supra note 6, at 133 (noting that the Resolution called for a cessation
of action affecting civilians).
91 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 337 (indicating that the situation deteriorated); see
also Chomsky, supra note 17, at 31 (stating the FRY believed they had a "green light"
from Washington to retaliate); Klinton W. Alexander, NATO's Intervention in Kosovo: The
Legal Case for Violating Yugoslavia's National Sovereignty in the Absence of Security
CouncilApproval, 22 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 403, 405-06 (2000) (indicating the dramatic surge
in violence between February 1998 and March 1999).
92 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 380 (describing the brutality of the Serb tactics); see
also Chomsky, supra note 17, at 134-35 (stating that NATO had mixed reports of
responsibility on both sides, and although Serbs were committing atrocities, NATO
understood this as a reaction to the 40% takeover of Kosovo by the KLA); Alan Little,
Behind the Kosovo Crisis, BBC News, availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/
674056.stm (Mar. 12, 2000) (reporting that "the KLA played a subtle but deadly game in
which the willingness of the Serb police and Yugoslav army to commit atrocities against
civilians was skillfully manipulated to coax the international community into action").
93 S.C. Res 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3930 mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199
(1998).
94 Id. at 2 (acknowledging the threat to peace and security); see also Dale Carson,
Contemporary InternationalLaw Issues: The Kosovo Question, 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 167,
168 (2000) (noting the need to take action to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe); Judith
A. Miller, Reflections on National Security and International Law Issues During the
Clinton Administration, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 219, 223 (2002) (indicating that the rationale
behind the Resolution was the threat to peace in the region).
95 See Stone, supra note 91, at 519 (noting the demand of the Resolution to cease
hostility); Tania Voon, Closing the Gap Between Legitimacy and Legality of Humanitarian
Intervention: Lessons from East Timor and Kosovo, 7 UCLA J. INT'L & FOREIGN AFF. 31,
50 (2002) (discussing the Resolution's declaration that the event was a threat to peace and
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Furthermore, the Security Council decided that "should the
concrete measures demanded in this resolution and resolution
1160 (1998) not be taken, [it will] consider further action and
additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in
the region." 96
At this crucial juncture NATO began to explore the possibility
of acting outside of the framework of the Security Council.
Though Resolution 1199 (1998) alluded to "further action," this
alone was a legally insufficient phrase to supply a groundwork
for the U.N. or NATO to threaten or use force against the FRY.97
This is because any threat or use of armed force must be
approved by all five permanent members of the Security
Council. 98 In this instance it was all but certain that Russia and
China would exercise their veto power to thwart any use of force
against the FRY.99 To NATO, this legal restraint on action was
unacceptable.
NATO regarded the "veto paralysis" in the
Security Council as the major flaw of operating within the U.N.
system. 100 Because a veto was certain, NATO never actually
security); Wippman, supra note 6, at 133 (discussing the same).
96 S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3930 mtg. 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199, at 5
(1998).
97 See Simma, supra note 40 (stating that Resolution 1199 was not sufficient by itself
for UN Member States or international organizations to intervene in the conflict
militarily); see also Michael Ashkouri, Note, Has United States Foreign Policy Towards
Libya, Iraq, and Serbia Violated Executive Order 12333: Prohibitionon Assassination?, 7
NEW ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 155, 171 (2001) (indicating that the Resolution's text
does not authorize the use of force). But see Alexander, supra note 92, at 441 (noting
disagreement about whether the use of force was authorized).
98 See Thomas D. Grant, Extending Decolonization: How the United Nations Might
have Addressed Kosovo, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 9, 12 (1999) (stating that the Security
Council may only use force if all five permanent members authorize its use); see also
Chomsky, supra note 17, at 73 (stating that the threat or use of force is illegal unless the
Security Council explicitly authorizes its use). See generally Inocencio Arias,
HumanitarianIntervention: Could the Security Council Kill the United Nations?, 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1005, 1019 (2000) (criticizing the U.N.'s structure as undemocratic
because the only members of the Security Council who wield veto power do not stand up
for election).
99 See Simma, supra note 40 (discussing Russia's intention to veto); see also Carson,
supra note 94, at 169 (indicating Russia's and China's expressed intention to veto
anything authorixing intervention in Kosovo); Robert F. Turner, Kosovo: Legal and Policy
Considerations, 10 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 67, 72 (1999/2000) (noting Russia's and China's
decision to veto effective action).
100 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 11 n.19 (pointing out that since the 1960's, the
U.S. and Great Britain actually lead in vetoing Security Council Resolutions, despite the
fact that NATO accused Russia and China of paralyzing the U.N.'s effectiveness); see also
Makau wa Mutua, Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An Argument for DemarginalizingEnforcement, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 211, 244 (1998) (discussing the
effects of veto paralysis); Sompong Sucharitkul, Jurisdictional Terrorism and the Rule of
InternationalLaw, Speech Before the Students at Golden Gate University (Oct. 2001), in
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sought Security Council authorization for the threat or use of
force against the FRY.1O1 The Alliance then clearly broke free
from the constraints of the U.N. system governing force when it
threatened the FRY with immediate air strikes. 10 2
The legal principle that NATO espoused in acting outside of
the U.N. framework was the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention. 103 Interestingly, at the same time that NATO
decided not to follow the U.N.'s formal restraints on the threat or
use of force, it publicly declared that their threat of force (and
later action) against the FRY was based on the spirit and
principles of the Charter itself.1 0 4 NATO needed to contravene
the Charter framework while simultaneously enforcing it
because the U.N. was "paralyzed" by the Security Council veto
mechanism and could not act.105 The situation from NATO's
perspective was summed up by NATO Secretary-General Javier
Solana in a letter to the permanent representatives of the
Alliance on October 9, 1998, where he delineated NATO's
objectives:

GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV., Spring 2002, at 312 (explaining that vetoes result in some
paralysis).
101 See Carson, supra note 95, at 169 (mentioning the expected veto). See generally
John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 205, 208
(2000) (noting the problems with circumventing the Security Council); Smith, supra note
59, at 10 (discussing the use of force by NATO without prior authorization).
102 See, e.g., Ida L. Bostian, Hazardous Materials and Energy: The Environmental
Consequences of the Kosovo Conflict and NATO Bombing of Serbia, 1999 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVT'L L. & POL1Y 230 (1999 Yearbook) (noting that the air strikes were launched by
NATO as "Operation Allied Force"); Medenica, supra note 5, at 340-41 (noting the threat
of air strikes against FRY); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practiceof the United States
Relating to International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 630 (1999) (noting NATO's
authorization of air strikes against FRY).
103 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 351 (discussing the use of force for humanitarian
intervention without Security Council authorization); see also Jules Lobel, American
Hegemony and InternationalLaw: Benign Hegemony? Kosovo and Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 19, 27 (2000) (indicating that international law is moving
toward the use of forceful humanitarian intervention when necessary); Virgil Wiebe,
Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate Weapons Under International
HumanitarianLaw, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 85, 127 (2000) (noting that NATO's action was
widely hailed as humanitarian intervention).
104 See Simma, supra note 38 (discussing the U.N. Charter's basic principle; see also
Medenica, supra note 5, at 337-38 (noting that the Alliance declared that any use of force
against the FRY closely paralleled the principles of the Charter). See generally Burton,
supra note 32, at 55 (stating that the use of force is not authorized by the U.N. Charter
but may be lawful if it conforms with customary international law).
105 See Grant, supra note 98, at 12 (analyzing the inner workings of the U.N. Security
Council); Voon, supra note 95, at 33 (claiming that NATO's intervention was illegal since
it was done in contravention of UN Charter); see also Medenica, supra note 5, at 341
(noting NATO justifications for attack).
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The FRY has not yet complied with the urgent demands of
the International Community, despite UNSC Resolution
1160 of 31 March 1998 followed by UNSC 1199 of 23
September 1998, both acting under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter.
The very stringent report of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations pursuant to both resolutions warned inter
alia of the danger of an humanitarian disaster in Kosovo.
The continuation of a humanitarian catastrophe, because no
concrete measures towards a peaceful solution of the crisis
have been taken by the FRY.
The fact that another UNSC Resolution containing a clear
enforcement action with regard to Kosovo cannot be expected
in the foreseeable future.
The deterioration of the situation in Kosovo and its
magnitude constitute a serious threat to peace and security
in the region as explicitly referred to in the UNSC Resolution
1199.
On the basis of this discussion, I conclude that the Allies
believe that in the particular circumstances with respect to
the present crisis in Kosovo as described in UNSC Resolution
the Alliance to
1199, there are legitimate grounds1 0 for
6
threaten and if necessary, to use force.
Solana's letter induced a series of intensive negotiations
between NATO and the FRY, culminating in a deal between
Richard Holbrook, former U.S. ambassador to the United
Nations, and Milosevic.1 0 7 The deal included a cease-fire
agreement and an authorization for the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to establish a verification
mission in Kosovo. 108 There was considerable but temporary
improvement on the ground in Kosovo. 10 9 Events took a turn for
the worst on January 15, 1999 when Serb forces attacked the
106 Simma, supra note 38.
107 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 339-40 (stating Holbrook and Milosevic reached a
deal); see also Little, supra note 92 (submitting that Holbrook was responsible for
negotiating the deal); Simma, supra note 38 (discussing Holbrook's negotiating role).
108 See Simma, supra note 38 (noting that the agreement included a ceasefire and
established a verification mission); see also Medenica, supra note 5, at 339 (stating that
the Security Council approved these diplomatic measures in Resolution 1203). See
generally Little, supra note 92 (intimating that a ceasefire had been achieved).
109 See Simma, supra note 38 (noting that humanitarianism and security improved in
the region); see also Medenica, supra note 5, at 340 (stating the Security Council
cautiously restated that the conflict constituted a continuing threat to peace in the
region). See generally Little, supra note 92 (insinuating improvements in the area just
prior to Racak).
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village of Racak, resulting in the death of forty-five Albanians.110
Media coverage placed the incident squarely on the world stage
and could have been the determinative factor in NATO's decision
to use force.111
B. The Rambouillet Peace Efforts - Were All Peaceful Means

Exhausted?
In a final effort to reach a peaceful settlement, Serb
representatives and members of the KLA met at the Rambouillet
Castle in France.11 2 The Rambouillet meeting was less a
negotiation than it was an ultimatum issued by NATO to the
FRY.113 The proposals demanded that Kosovo become an
autonomous region within Yugoslavia, but under NATO
control. 1 14 In three years it called for a referendum on Kosovo's
formal independence.115 The KLA was also to hand in its
weapons to NATO.116 However, the harshest term of the
proposals demanded that NATO, instead of the U.N.,u7 be
110 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 340 (stating that all killed at Racak were civilians);
Simma, supra note 38 (descibing that violence ensued once again in Racak); see also
Little, supra note 92 (calling the Serb attack in Racak a massacre).
111 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 340 (stating that NATO reaffirmed their threats of
air strikes, which a Yugoslav representative denounced as illegal threats to the
sovereignty of the FRY); see also Little, supra note 92 (discussing US Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright's feelings that post-Racak it was time for action); Simma, supra note
38 (quoting UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's speech made shortly after the events at
Racak at a press conference in Brussels where he commented regarding the preconditions
for the use of force against the FRY - stating that "normally a UN Security Council
Resolution is required").
112 See Kissinger, supra note 18, at 262 (stating the Rambouillet talks were held
under the chairmanship of the British and French foreign ministers but actually under
the auspices of the U.S. Secretary of State); see also Medenica, supra note 5, at 340
(stating that the meeting was held under direction of the Alliance); Little, supra note 92
(referring to Rambouillet meeting as a last ditch effort at settlement).
113 See Kissinger, supra note 18, at 262 (stating that the Rambouillet proposals were
essentially an ultimatum); see also Chomsky, supra note 17, at 108 (referring to
Rambouillet as a "take it or leave it" plan). See generally Medenica, supra note 5, at 341
(noting that rejection of terms resulted air strikes).
114 The
full
terms of the
Rambouillet
proposals
are
available
at
http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edudramb.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2003).
115 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 103 n.29 (explaining Rambouillet process); Jane
Perlez, U.S. Running Out of Time to Decide on Kosovo Force, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at
A3 (stating three year time frame had been laid out within which to determine Kosovo's
autonomy); Jane Perlez, U.S. Negotiatorat the Kosovo Talks Visits Milosevic, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 1999, at A12 (noting three-year time frame).
116 See Kissinger, supra note 18, at 262 (stating the KLA was to turn in its arms to
NATO); see also Mandel, supra note 19, at 103 n.29 (intimating hand-over of arms by
reference to a call to end hostilities). See generally Voon, supra note 95, at 49 (discussing
arms embargo imposed on Yugoslavia).
117 See Little, supra note 92 (explaining sentiments that NATO be the primary force).
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awarded unfettered access throughout the entire territory of
Yugoslavia as well as occupation of Kosovo.118 BBC
correspondent Alan Little stated that Rambouillet's insistence on
NATO's complete occupation of all of the FRY, and the call for
NATO forces instead of U.N. peacekeepers, made it highly
unlikely that the Serbs would accept the deal.1 19
Prior to Rambouillet, the FRY declared it was willing to
withdraw forces from Kosovo, accept a U.N. presence in the
province, and grant Kosovo limited autonomy.120 But NATO
insisted that the Alliance must retain control over Kosovo.121
Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State under Richard
Nixon, observed: "for anyone familiar with Serbian history, the
Rambouillet proposals were certain to lead to war." 12 2 As
speculated, the Serbian National Assembly rejected the terms of

See generally Mandel, supra note 19, at 103 n.29 (noting a call for OSCE authority);
Medenica, supra note 5, at 387-88 (alluding to strict NATO control of the area).
118 Appendix B, § 8 of the Rambouillet proposals reads:
8. NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and
equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY
including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be
limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or
facilities as required for support, training, and operations.
119 See Little, supra note 92 (positing that Americans expected the Serbs to reject the
deal); see also Kissinger, supra note 18, at 262 (predicting that the harsh proposals would
lead to war); Mandel, supra note 19, at 104 (suggesting that total NATO occupation was
intended to impossible to accept).
120 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 111-22 (suggesting Milosevic's acceptance of some
agreements); Medenica, supra note 5, at 388-89 (discussing Milosevic's one time
willingness toward an international presence); Jane Perlez, Crisis in the Balkans: The
Serbian Leader, Milosevic Defiant but Offers a Pact, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1999, at Al
(outlining terms Milosevic would have agreed to).
121 See generally Mandel, supra note 19, at 105-06 (discussing generally NATO
demands); Medenica, supra note 5, at 390 (alluding to NATO insistence); Voon, supra note
95, at 50-51 (articulating broadly the NATO mindset).
122 Kissinger explained that "the country [Serbia] that had fought the Ottoman and
Austrian empires, often alone, and had fiercely resisted Hitler and Stalin without the help
of allies, would never permit transit of foreign troops or turn a province containing its
historic shrines over to NATO." Kissinger, supra note 18, at 262. Professor Chomsky
asserted that no country would accept the harsh terms of Rambouillet except in the case
of an unconditional surrender, and bringing attention to the fact that despite the
immense coverage the Kosovo crisis received, he could find no accurate reporting of the
terms of Rambouillet, which he calls a "take it or leave it" plan. Chomsky questions
whether the "diplomatic failure" of Rambouillet was an intentional failure so that NATO
could implement the air strikes it had threatened for so long. Chomsky, supra note 17, at
107-08.
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NATO air strikes began the

next day. 124

Because the Rambouillet was the final push for peace before
hostilities were initiated, it becomes necessary to compare its
terms to the final peace settlement in order to see whether there
was room for further negotiation and a peaceful means of
settlement before the leap to war was made. The final resolution
that ended the Kosovo bombing was the Kosovo Peace Accord

signed on June 3,

1999.125

Many scholars criticized NATO for not

negotiating the Rambouillet proposals in good faith because their
rigid take it or leave it nature. 12 6 These critics point to the fact
that the Kosovo Peace Accord's terms were very close to what the
FRY was willing to accept before Rambouillet. 12 7 Under the final
agreement the FRY agreed to an international presence with
only substantial, not exclusive, NATO participation. 128 The
province of Kosovo was to be controlled by the U.N. instead of
NATO.129 Eradicated from the final peace plan were the very
terms that the FRY adamantly refused to accept at Rambouillet:
free NATO access to the entire FRY, full military and political
control over Kosovo in NATO, and an independence referendum
for Kosovo after three years.13 0 Serious questions can be raised
as to whether NATO had actually exhausted all peaceful means
to settle the crisis before the decision was made to go to war. 13 1 If
NATO had offered more lenient terms at Rambouillet, war may
123 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 108-09 (stating the FRY rejected any occupying
force in its territory); Mandel, supra note 19, at 98 (stating that Serbs rejected the
proposals); Little, supra note 92 (reporting Serbian rejection).
124 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 134 (noting the campaign was initiated on March
24).
125 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 389-90 (stating that the Kosovo Peace accord,
agreed to by NATO and Serbia, halted the Alliance's bombing).
126 See Thomas Michael McDonnell, Cluster Bombs Over Kosovo: A Violation of
InternationalLaw?, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 31, 36 n.12 (2002); see also Falk, supra note 17, at
850-51, 855 (stating that NATO's failure to negotiate in good faith "casts a dark shadow
over the NATO initiative"); Wippman, supra note 6, at 139.
127 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 389, 390 n.453 (stating that NATO rejected the
more lenient Serbian resolution proposed by the Group of Eight (G-8), consisting of Russia
and the major Western nations).
128 See id. (stating that NATO was largely left out of the Kosovo Peace Accord and
was only mentioned in their capacity as a security presence).
129 See id. (noting military control of the province was the U.N.'s responsibility).
130 See id. (adding that the Security Council resolution that endorsed the Kosovo
Peace Accord does not mention NATO).
131 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 107-08 (asserting NATO intentionally failed on
the diplomatic front at Rambouillet in order to legitimize their initiation of air strikes).
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not only have been avoided, but peacekeepers could have been on
the ground in Kosovo immediately to avert a deterioration of the
humanitarian situation, which that the bombing would initiate.

III. THE LEGALITY OF THE OPERATION: THE CLASH BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNIVERSAL MORALITY

Although NATO asserted that its rationale for threatening and
ultimately using force against the FRY mirrored the spirit of the
U.N. Charter, most international law scholars agree that NATO
made little effort to justify the intervention under the U.N.
framework.132 Professor Antonio Cassese,133 although a
proponent of the war, points out that such legitimization - that
NATO followed the spirit of the U.N. - is an insufficient legal
ground for commencing an armed intervention against another
sovereign state. 134 It is, for the most part, uncontested that
NATO's justification for the use of force lay primarily with the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention.13 5 Because there is no
"humanitarian exception" for the use of force under the Charter,
most scholars agree that the Kosovo intervention violated
international law. 136
For some international lawyers, the fact that the NATO
operation was unauthorized by the Security Council would be the
132 See Wippman, supra note 6, at 131 (stating that NATO's breach of the UN
Charter was "clear and apparent"); see also Cassese, supra note 11 (stating the Charter
was breached).
133 Former President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and former Presiding Judge of Trial Chamber II of the ICTY. See note 11
supra.
134 See Cassese, supra note 11 (stating NATO's argument force was justified based on
the U.N. Resolutions that had declared the situation in Kosovo as a "threat to peace" also
do not withstand legal scrutiny because that language is insufficient to invoke the use of
force under the Charter); see also Malone, supra note 4, at 591 (stating moral justification
for the use of force is no substitute for legal justification).
135 See Stannard, supra note 69, at 619-20; see also Charney, supra note 11, at 1232.
136 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 109; see also Charney, supra note 11, at 1235.
Cassese agrees that force was taken outside the UN framework. He says that the
intervention was without a Security Council authorization under Chapter VII and force
could not be justified as self-defense pursuant to Article 51. He adds that the intervention
"radically departs from the Charter system for collective security... there is no gainsaying
that the Charter system has been transgressed, in that a group of states has deliberately
resorted to armed action against a sovereign state without authorization to do so by the
Security Council." Cassese, supra note 11. For a discussion advocating a new legal
paradigm to replace the U.N. framework, see generally Colonel Guy B. Roberts, The
Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: A Legal Regime for Enforcing the Norm
Prohibitingthe Proliferationof Weapons of Mass Destruction,27 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
483, 484-85 (1999).
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end of the analysis. 37 In this view, because the U.N. Charter is a
jus cogens norm and the NATO bombing clearly violated its
precepts, no further inquiry is needed; its illegality compels a
rejection.138
In light of the universal recognition that the
protection of human rights is a peremptory norm, this view
seems unacceptable. Professor Cassese sums up this point:
[A]ny person of common sense is justified in asking him or
herself the following dramatic question: Faced with such an
enormous human-made tragedy and given the inaction of the
UN Security Council due to the refusal of Russia and China
to countenance any significant involvement by the
international community to stop the massacres and
expulsions, should one sit idly by and watch thousands of
human beings being slaughtered or brutally persecuted?
Should one remain silent and inactive only because the
existing body of international law proves incapable of
remedying such a situation? Or, rather, should respect for
the Rule of Law be sacrificed on the altar of human
compassion?Z39
Professor Cassese's argument is emotionally intriguing, yet
ultimately simplistic.
Cassese asserts that the antiinterventionist camp rejected the NATO bombing based on sheer
disregarding
the
moral
considerations
of
legalism,
nonintervention.1 40 For Professor Cassese, the bombing was
indeed illegal, yet it was moral. Cassese continued: "from an
ethical viewpoint resort to armed force was justified.
Nevertheless, as a legal scholar I cannot avoid observing in the
same breath that his moral action is contrary to international
law."141 Professor Cassese reasoned that there is a universal
obligation on the part of all countries to respect human rights,
erga omnes.
Accordingly, no law could justly prevent an
137 See Wippman, supra note 6, at 131 (asserting that merely labeling the campaign
as illegal is inadequate).
138 See id. (observing that the Charter's main purpose was to reduce armed conflict so
all non.dpfensive uses of force must be approved by a supermajority of the Security
Council).
139 Cassese, supra note 11.
140 See id. (stating that NATO's intervention was legitimate because it was morally
justified by "contemporary trends of the international community" and the intervention
should not be rejected for merely being against current international law). Cassese uses
this premise as a segue to his eventual conclusion that current international law should
bend to these emerging moral trends.
141 Cassese, supra note 11 (emphasis in original).
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intervention for humanitarian purposes, and so the U.N.
mandates against intervention should be disregarded. 142
Professor Cassese is correct to assert that there is a moral
imperative to prevent the trampling of human rights anywhere
in the world.
However, I present the view that the antiinterventionist stance is a well-grounded moral position and in
the end will do more to ensure the protection of human rights.
This position is not based upon the inherent good of notions of
sovereignty based on tradition. Rather, it affirms the strictures
of the U.N. system as having exclusive control over any use of
force because the U.N. best advances the protection of
international human rights. When NATO's bombing is examined
as a whole, all of the mishaps of the operation can be taken as
proof of the dangers and unintended consequences of deploying
armed force. What NATO called the "veto paralysis" of the U.N.
system is actually the U.N. system functioning smoothly.14 3
Although humanitarian crises evoke an emotional response, in
the end, only deliberation and peaceful solutions assure the
protection of human rights.144 As stated below, a rejection of the
U.N. framework for international affairs is a dangerous
precedent for the future of international law.14 5 In the end,

142 See id. (stating that a "unilateral resort to armed violence [outside of Security
Council authorization] is justified... to terminate violations of human rights").
143 But see Maj. Joseph P. "Dutch" Bialke, United Nations Peace Operations:
Applicable Norms and the Application of the Law of Armed Conflict, 50 A.F. L. REV. 1, 6
(2001) (noting that during the Cold War the veto power of permanent members thwarted
UN's security and peacekeeping efforts); Jonathan Charney, Asia Publication:Highlights
of October ASIL, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. NEWSL. (Sept. 1993) (contending that the Security
Council is dominated by a few that use the veto as a threat); Mutua, supra note 100, at
244 (suggesting that intervention into human rights violations is subject to a veto by one
of the five permanent members of the Security Council).
144 See discussion infra Part V; see also Charney & Prescott, supra note 64, at 476
(claiming that peaceful solutions will only result from cooperative efforts from adversarial
parties); Falk, supra note 17, at 855 (reasoning that force should be a secondary
consideration to diplomacy).
145 See Thomas D. Grant, Extending Decolonization: How the United Nations May
Have Addressed Kosovo, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 9, 12 (1999) (noting that attempts to
enforce international law with military measures without UN authority have occurred).
But see Maj. Louis A. Chiarella, United Nations Operations: Problems Encountered by
United States Forces When Subject to a 'Blue Purse," 154 MIL. L. REV. 53, 63-64 (1997)
(maintaining that UN members and regional organizations may conduct peacekeeping
missions outside of the UN's framework); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How To Reform the
United Nations: Lessons From the International Economic Law Revolution, 2 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 185, 188 (1998) (stating that "the revolutionary strengthening of
human rights, democracies, and liberal peace throughout Europe have been achieved
outside the UN framework").
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deviation from the U.N. Charter would do more to hurt the cause
of international human rights than they do to promote it.146
Even if NATO was justified to use force on moral grounds, the
intervention cannot escape scrutiny for the manner in which
force was used. When nations resort to force, it still must be
deployed according to principles of proportionality and just
The jus in bello, proper conduct in war, must be
war. 147
separately analyzed from the jus ad bellum, the decision to fight
a war. 14 8 Upon examination of NATO's wartime conduct, grave
questions can be raised about its military decision-making
according to the laws of war.
IV. THE OPERATION

NATO's campaign against the FRY, code-named "Operation
Allied Force", was commenced on March 24, 1999 and was
suspended on June 10, 1999.149 In 78 days of around-the-clock
bombing15 0 NATO flew over 38,000 sorties, dropped 25,000
146 See Ruth Wedgwood, Editorial Comments: NATO's Kosovo Intervention: NATO's
Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 833 (1999) (stating that the aims of the
UN Charter are the guarantee of human rights and international security); see also
Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 245
(2000) (observing that international human rights concerns became prominent after the
onset of state accountability); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to InternationalLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 626, 627 n.10 (2001) (noting the
correlation between the obligations under the UN Charter and protection of human
rights).
147 See John B. Anderson, The Institute for Global Legal Studies Inaugural
Colloquium: The UN and the Protection of Human Rights: Global Governments and
Democratization,5 WASH U. J.L & POL'Y 27, 31 (2001) (noting that the use of force is
under control of Security Council); see also Phillip J. Collins, Reports of ASIL Program:
ASIL Capitol Hill Briefing Held on U.S. Role in UN Peacekeeping, AM. SOC'y INT'L L.
NEWSL. (Nov. 1993) (noting that UN participation is viewed as a benefit by having to send
less troops per member state); Walter Hoffman, U.S. Commission on Improving UN
Completes Hearings and Begins Work on Report, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. NEWSL. (June
1993) (proposing that the UN adopt an armed forces capability).
148 See generally Michael J. Matheson, The Opinions of the International Court of
Justice on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 417 (1997) (discussing
the concepts of jus ad bello and jus ad bellum in the context of nuclear war); Meyer, supra
note 26, at 143 n.3 (explaining the distinction between the terms); Steven R. Ratner, Jus
Ad Bellum and Jus Ad Bello After September 11, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 905, 905-06 (2002)
(explicating that jus ad hello concepts predated jus ad bellum concepts).
149 See generally Richard C. Hottelet, The Institute for Global Legal Studies
Inaugural Colloquium: The UN and the Protection of Human Rights: Ups and Downs in
UN History, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 17, 24 (2001) (contemplating the effect of UN force
in Yugoslavia on international human rights violators); Davor Sopf, Temporary Protection
in Europe After 1990: The "Right to Remain" of Genuine Convention Refugees, 6 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 109, 139-40 (2001) (discussing the historical background of Yugoslavia).
150 See Kissinger, supra note 18, at 254 (stating that NATO bombed continuously);
see also Hottelet, supra note 149, at 24 (noting that the bombing of Yugoslavia was
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bombs that caused 60 to 100 billion dollars worth of damage on
the FRY.151 Approximately 2,000 Yugoslav civilians died.152
A. The Doctrine of Proportionalityin ProtocolI to the Geneva
Convention of 1949
Adopted in 1977, Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, which relates to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, is perhaps the most authoritative
statement of the principles which govern international armed
conflicts.15 3 This Protocol has been ratified by over 150 states,
although three of the nineteen members of NATO are not parties
to the Protocol. 15 4 The provisions of the Protocol are universally
accepted as customary international law and are binding
authority on all nations. 15 5 One of the most essential principles of
accompanied by UN ground forces); Patricia M. Wald, The Institute for Global Legal
Studies Inaugural Colloquium: The UN and the Protection of Human Rights: The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some
Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an InternationalCourt, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY
87, 100 (2001) (noting that the question of whether to investigate NATO decision-makers
with respect to the bombing of Belgrade was considered).
151 See Amnesty International, NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Collateral
Damage or Unlawful Killings?; Violations of the Laws of War by NATO During Operation
Allied Force, § 3.5, availableat http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGEUR700
182000 (June 6, 2000) (discussing the damage in Yugoslavia on a monetary scale)
[hereinafter Amnesty Report]; see also Lt. Col. Jeffrey K. Walker, Thomas P. Keenan
Memorial Lecture: The Demise of the Nation-State, the Dawn of New Paradigm Warfare, a
Future for the Profession of Arms, 51 A.F. L. REV. 323, 335 (2001) (speaking about the
Yugoslavian effort from the Air Force perspective).
152 See Laursen, supra note 6, at 767 (discussing the effects of the UN bombing);
Mandel, supra note 19, at 104 (comparing the military and civilian casualties).
153 See Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 2 (claiming that an understanding of
Additional Protocol I is critical to armed conflicts). But see Maj. Michael E. Guillory,
Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing the Rubicon, 51 A.F. L. REV. 111,
113 n.18 (2001) (noting that Additional Protocol I was never ratified by the U.S.). See
generally Maj. Lisa L. Turner & Maj. Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51
A.F. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2001) (discussing the operation and purpose of Additional Protocol
I).
154 See Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 2 (stating that the U.S., France and
Turkey have not ratified Protocol I, although key elements of Protocol I are incorporated
into the U.S.'s military code); see also Guillory, supra note 153, at 113 (discussing which
UN member nation-states have not ratified Additional Protocol I). See generally Meyer,
supra note 26 (addressing the ramifications of the signing of Protocol I on the Air Force).
155 See Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 2 (remarking that UN members are
obligated to adhere to Additional Protocol I); see also Capt. Robert G. Hanseman, The
Realities and Legalities of Information Warfare, 42 A.F. L. REV. 173, 180-81 (1997) (noting
that customary international law is binding on all civilize warring states); Brig. Gen.
Jerry S.T. Pitzul, OperationalLaw and the Legal Professional:A CanadianPerspective, 51
A.F. L. REV. 311, 314 (2001) (stating that although not all nations may accept the
principle, if the majority of nations accept it then it is considered international law and
binding on all nations").
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international law is that a country must exhaust all efforts to
distinguish between civilians and civilian objects from military
objectives.15 6 Embodied in Article 48 of Protocol I is the principle
of distinction regarding the protection of civilians: "In order to
ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all time
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military objectives."1 5 7
Article 51(2) of Protocol I states that the civilian population
"shall not be the object of attack."15 8 The proportionality doctrine
emerges from Article 51 (5), which describes a discriminate
attack as "an attack which may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilians objects,
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." 1 59 The
proportionality doctrine demands that any military intervention
must balance the military advantage of the attack with the
expected civilian injury the attack will inflict.160 According to this
principle, an indiscriminate attack occurs if it violates the
principle of distinction by attacking a military target without
considering the potential impact on civilians.16 1 An assessment of
the NATO bombing reveals that NATO military commanders did

156 See Richard C. Schneider, Jr., ASIL Insight: Geneva Conventions, Protocol II: The
Confrontationof Sovereignty and InternationalLaw, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. NEWSL. (Nov.
1995) (offering that Additional Protocol II was designed to protect children and civilians
during combative efforts). See generally Sopf, supra note 149 (maintaining that civilians'
rights are not suspended during war efforts); Turner & Norton, supra note 153
(remarking on the different roles that civilians play during wartime).
157 Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 3.1.
158 Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 2.1.
159 Id.

160 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 360-61 (tracing the foundations of the
proportionality doctrine back to the Middle Ages and Christian Just War theory); Stone,
supra note 90, at 506-07 (noting that the proportionality doctrine accepts that there will
be civilian casualties during war). See generally Judith Gail Graham, Proportionalityand
Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 391 (1993) (stating that the
proportionality doctrine is a fundamental concept in the law of force).
161 See Meyer, supra note 26, at 151 n.46 (stating that the burden is on the attacker
to show that the attack could not have been avoided); see also Hanseman, supra note 155,
at 190 (noting that vulnerability to indiscriminate attacks is a constant concern); Maj.
Thomas J. Herthel, On the Chopping Block: Cluster Munitions and the Law of War, 51
A.F. L. REV. 229, 261 (2001) (citing Article 51 of Protocol I as prohibiting indiscriminate
attacks).
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not always put the protection of civilians ahead of military
162
objectives, as discussed below.
1. Choice of Targets
NATO drastically miscalculated the length of the war. NATO
commanders, as well as President Clinton, predicted that the
Milosevic would surrender and the war would end in a matter of
days.163 Because of the small size of the FRY, roughly the size of
Ohio, purely military targets were successfully destroyed within
the first few days of the military operation.16 4 As a result, the
category of legitimate strike targets was extended to facilities
used by civilians.16 5 These targets included electrical power
plants, city bridges, railways, public buildings, factories, market
places, hospitals, embassies, water supplies, and residential
neighborhoods.16 6 Although NATO carried out strikes against
162 See McDonnell, supra note 126, at 37 n.14 (explaining how Kosovar Albanians left
Kosovo as a result of NATO bombings); see also Tania Voon, Pointing the Finger: Civilian
Casualties of NATO Bombing in Kosovo Conflict, 16 AM. U. INTL L. REV. 1083, 1098
(2001) (criticizing NATO's use of air bombardment as disproportionate to the protection
civilians). See generally Mertus, supra note 10, at 538 (noting that the NATO bombing
was an attempt at avoiding allied casualties, thereby creating a greater risk of civilian
casualties).
163 See Falk, supra note 17, at 851 (noting President Clinton acknowledged he
believed Milosevic would withdraw early); see also Little, supra note 92 (noting
Washington believed war would have ended quickly but was shocked when it continued);
Johanna McGeary, The Road to Hell... Was Paved with Good Intentions-But Muddled
Planning.Now What?, TIME, Apr. 12, 1999 (stating White House believed Milosevic would
"fold" a few days after NATO's bombings on Kosovo).
164 See Steven Lee Myers, Chinese Embassy Bombing: A Wide Net of Blame,
N.Y.TMES, Apr. 17, 2000, at Al (stating that this scramble for new targets led to such
mishaps as the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, one of the greatest
embarrassments of the war); see also Falk, supra note 17, at 851 (noting NATO bombing
was initially confined to military targets). See generally Stephen Lee Meyers, NATO Hits
Belgrade CenterFor First Time, Razing Command Sites For Kosovo Fighting,N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 1999, at Al (discussing first air strikes on Milosevic's security headquarters).
165 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) stated that "[diuring the
first week or so of airstrikes, the number of civilians casualties did in fact appear to be
low. As the air campaign intensified, however... both a corresponding rise in the number
of Serbian civilians victims and increased damage to civilian objects have been
observed..." Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 1. For example, it has been reported
that a Serbian television station was bombed. Robert Hayden, Biased "Justice"
Humanrightsism and the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 47
CLEV. ST. L.REV. 549, 556 (1999). For an argument criticizing NATO bombing for
targeting civilian structures because Milosevic was not submitting as quickly as they had
expected, see Falk, supra note 17, at 851.
166 See Richard Bilder, Kosovo And The "New Interventionism" Promise or Peril?, 9 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 153, 168-69 (listing NATO's targets of civilian infrastructures); see
also Wippman, supra note 6, at 147 (listing NATO's targets); Mandel, supra note 19, at
114 (noting NATO military commanders choice of infrastructure targets); Laursen, supra
note 6, at 779 (discussing NATO's choice of targets); Medenica, supra note 5, at 410
(criticizing NATO's choice of civilian targets).
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these targets for their military value, attacks on infrastructure of
this type can foreseeably cause extensive civilian causalities and
hardship.167 One of the most controversial attacks of the war was
the NATO bombing of the Serbian state television and radio
station in Belgrade,168 which killed 16 civilians but only blacked
out the Serbian government's broadcast of "propaganda" for three
hours. 169 Although NATO made efforts to limit civilian
casualties, attacks such as the one against the television station
suggest they could have done more to protect civilian life.170
Some analysts believe this widening of legitimate targets to
include civilian-used infrastructure shows that NATO was
interested in trying to break civilian morale, which would put
popular pressure on Milosevic to capitulate.171 Such an objective
- attempting to break civilian morale for military purposes - is

illegal

under the proportionality

Convention.17 2

doctrine of the Geneva

167 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 114-15 (criticizing NATO targets as having little
military value and therefore were more likely civilian targets); see also Mertus, supra note
10, at 539 (examining whether NATO's targets were legitimate "dual use" targets under
Geneva Convention's Protocol 1 to justify their bombing); see, e.g., Medenica, supra note 5,
at 422 (questioning legitimacy of bridges as military targets and noting some bridges were
next to populated areas).
168 See Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 5.3 (stating that NATO viewed the
station as a propaganda machine); see also Voon, supra note 162, at 1105-06 (explaining
NATO justified bombing of Serbian broadcasting station because it viewed it as a
propaganda machine and used for FRY's military purposes). See generally Herman
Reinhold, Target Lists: A 1923 Idea With Applications For The Future, 10 TULSA J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 1, 62 n.172 (2002) (noting bombing of TV station as one of most controversial
NATO bombings in Kosovo).
169 See Stannard, supra note 69, at 618 (noting bombing of television station led to
civilian deaths); see also Voon, supra note 162, at 1105 (discussing bombing of Serbian
television station by NATO led to civilian casualties). See generally Chinkin, supra note
37, at 38.
170 NATO pilots didn't necessarily do all they could have to avoid civilian casualties.
See McDonnell, supra note 126, at 38-39. Amnesty International also points out that
NATO could have issued warnings prior to attacks to protect the civilian populations, in
accordance with Additional Protocol I, Article 57, 2(c), but NATO rejected such a policy on
the basis that it may endanger the pilots of the attacking aircraft. See Amnesty Report,
supra note 151, at 3.4. A Human Rights Watch Report asserted NATO could have avoided
civilian casualties if "NATO had followed the rules." Elizabeth Becker, Rights Group Says
NATO Killed 500 Civilians in Kosovo War, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 7, 2000, at A10.
171 Mandel, supra note 19, at 104, 113 (stating NATO bombing of Kosovo was simply
meant to break civilian morale); see also Bilder, supra note 166, at 171-72 (arguing
attacking civilian targets was meant with the hope civilians would force Milosevic to give
up to NATO's demands); Meyer, supranote 26, at 176-77 (stating NATO intended to effect
civilian morale with its chosen targets).
172 See Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 5.3 (discussing illegitimacy of military
targets meant to break civilian morale). See generally Mertus, supra note 10, at 540
(arguing NATO's choice of continuing its bombing was not advancing military objectives
but causing a detrimental effect upon Serb population thereby violating proportionality
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2. High Altitude Aerial Bombing
Throughout the 78-day bombing campaign NATO sustained
zero combat casualties - an unprecedented accomplishment in the
history of warfare. 17 3 NATO avoided combat casualties primarily
because of its policy against flying aircraft below 15,000 feet.174
At such an altitude NATO aircraft and bombers were well beyond
the reach of Yugoslav anti-aircraft artillery. 17 5 However, the
consequence of this decision was to sacrifice the accuracy of
hitting targets, resulting in a higher percentage of bombs going
astray and increased civilian casualties.176 Although the majority
of NATO's weaponry was laser-guided,1 7 7 a considerable amount
of NATO's arsenal required pilots to physically see the target
during the attack.178 Thus, the higher the altitude at which
aircraft operated, the less clearly the pilot could discern the true
nature of a target. In a number of incidents NATO pilots
mistakenly attacked groups of refugees in their belief that they
doctrine); Meyer, supra note 26, at 177 (noting if NATO's intent to target civilian morale
was illegitimate under international law).
173 See Wippman, supra note 6, at 146 (noting that NATO fought the first "zerocasualty" war); see also Voon, supra note 95, at 88 (noting NATO's intervention in Kosovo
resulted in "zero NATO casualties"); Richard Valk, A Just Response; United States To
Terrorists,NATION, Oct. 8, 2001, at 11 (noting NATO war is labeled as "zero casualties").
174 See Wippman, supra note 6, at 146 (stating NATO had a policy of flying aircraft at
15,000 feet or higher); see also Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 3.4 (stating that
NATO officials concede that the high-altitude bombing reduced the bombing
effectiveness). See generally Voon, supra, note 95, at 89 (discussing NATO's decision to
not fly less than 15,000 feet in order to avoid military casualties).
175 See Wippman, supra note 6, at 146 (observing high-altitude bombings protected
NATO pilots from anti-aircraft fire); see also Medenica, supra note 5, at 406 (explaining
one reason NATO chose to fly aircraft at 15,000 feet was to avoid ground fire); Voon,
supra note 162, at 1103 (stating NATO pilots flew at altitudes of above 15,000 to avoid
Yugoslav air defenses).
176 See Wippman, supra note 6, at 146 (stating that as the campaign dragged on,
NATO decided to choose more and more targets in "downtown" areas); see also Medenica,
supra note 5, at 405-07(discussing how flying at high altitudes caused pilots difficulty in
hitting military targets). See generally McDonnell, supra note 126, at 49 (noting that
dropping cluster bombs from aircraft at higher altitudes increased chances of missing
targets and could have gone against NATO's objective of limiting civilian casualties).
177 See Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 3.7 (stating that only about one third of
NATO's weaponry was precision-guided); see also Voon, supra note 162, at 1099 (noting
NATO used "precision guided munitions" in a third of its attacks). See generally Falk,
supra note 17, at 851 (observing NATO's bombings were primarily reinforced by "smart"
weaponry).
178 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 405-07 (noting much of the weaponry required
NATO's pilots to see throughout the attack to prevent civilian casualties); see also
Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 3.4 (stating that the high-altitude allowed the pilot
to see whether a particular target was the one intended, but not whether civilians had
moved into the area). See generally McDonnell, supra note 126, at 39-40 (arguing NATO's
plan of flying at high altitude made it difficult to distinguish between civilian and
legitimate targets).
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were military convoys. 179 Lower altitudes would have exposed
NATO pilots to greater risks, yet such unintended attacks on
civilians would have been minimized.i8 0 The effect of NATO's
policy was to shift the risk of casualties from NATO pilots to
civilians on the ground in the FRY. 181
Another aspect of the high altitude aerial bombing relates to
NATO's stated objective. We must recall that the purpose of
initiating aggression against the FRY was to thwart atrocities
that federal Serbian forces were committing in Kosovo against
ethnic Albanians. These atrocities were occurring on the ground
within villages and in houses and often under cover of night. 182 It
is apparent that NATO was less effective in stopping atrocities
occurring on the ground in Kosovo because of the altitude
restrictions placed on NATO pilots.18 3 If the stated humanitarian
purpose was to stop the violence in Kosovo, high altitude aerial

179 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 406-07 (describing two incidents in which NATO
mistook a group of tractors to be military tanks, and a refugee camp to be a military
camp, killing 160 refugees); see also Aaron Schwabach, NATO's War in Kosovo and the
Final Report To the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal For the Former
Yugoslavia, 9 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 167, 177-78 (2001) (discussing attack on Albanian
convoy of civilians fleeing Djakovica). See generally Voon, supra note 162, at 1103-04
(discussing mistaken attack on Albanian refugee convoy believed to be military vehicle).
180 See Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 3.4 (stating that NATO could have
avoided as many civilian deaths if it had chosen to fly at altitudes less than 15,000 feet
thereby allowing pilots to have clearer visibility of targets); see also Medenica, supra note
5, at 408-09 (arguing NATO did not do everything possible to avoid civilian deaths when
it limited its pilots to fly at altitudes not lower than 15,000 feet with weaponry that
required them to see their targets, which could not accurately have been done as is
evidenced in the number of mistaken bombings on civilians); Voon, supra note 162, at
1104 (stating that NATO even recognized if its pilots had flown at altitudes lower than
15,000 feet, they would have distinguished civilian groups from military groups).
181 See id. (stating that priority was given to the safety of NATO pilots over Yugoslav
civilians); Jack Kelly, The Balkan Morass: Clinton's Folly Proved by Subsequent Events,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 11, 2001, at E-3 (arguing that it was NATO's "attacks"
on civilian targets that forced Serbia to seek peace); Letters, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at
T12 (arguing that high altitude bombing led to bombing of civilian infrastructure).
182 See Nicolas Rothwell, Cold War Survivor Boils Over - Revolt in Yugoslavia,
WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 7, 2000, at 2 (discussing the many atrocities that occurred in
Yugoslavia after the fall of the Soviet Union); Timothy Gordon Ash, The war we almost
lost: Was NATO's Kosovo campaign a legitimate response to humanitariancatastropheor
did it cause one? How did a poor Balkan country make a mockery of the world's greatest
powers for more than a month? And why did Slobodan Milosevic finally capitulate?Now
that the smoke has cleared Timothy Gordon Ash searches for answers, GUARDIAN, Sept. 4,
2000, at 2 (noting that Milosevic was engaging in ethnic cleansing before the war began).
183 See Wippman, supra note 6, at 146 (noting high latitude bombing was little use in
saving Kosovars from ethnic cleansing on the ground); see also Kelly, supra note 181
(arguing that high altitude bombing was ineffective and caused civilian casualties). See
generally Ash, supra note 182, at 2 (insinuating that for first stages of war NATO actually
seemed to be losing).
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bombing is not an effective means of preventing Yugoslav forces
84
from murdering Albanians in their villages. 1
3. Ruling Out Ground Troops
An important element in NATO's war plan was maintaining
popular support for the war on the home front. 8 5 With media in
the Western countries flashing images of the plight of the ethnic
Albanians and mass graves, there was a sympathetic push to
take up arms against the FRY.186 In order to keep this popular
domestic support for the Kosovo war high, NATO publicly ruled
18 7
out the use of ground troops even before the campaign began.
Avoiding casualties were especially a concern for the United
States, where another Vietnam would produce a public
outrage.' 8 8 NATO commanders believed that popular support for
184 See Charney, supra note 11, at 1247 (arguing that NATO strategy would not and
could not stop ground atrocities from occurring); Kelly, supra note 181 (arguing that high
altitude bombing was a cause of civilian casualties and did not accomplish what it was set
out to accomplish); see also Ash, supra note 182 (arguing that it was a mistake to believe
that high altitude bombing could stop the atrocities).
185 See Roger Cohen, Crisis in the Balkans Diplomacy: Schroder's Blunt 'No' to
Ground Troops in Kosovo Reflects Depth of German Sensitivities, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
1999, at 14 (noting that Germany insisted on no ground troops in order to maintain
popular support for the war); Ash, supra note 182 (noting that State Department officials
did not publicly state their opinions on the duration of the war in order to keep unity on
the homefront); Michael R. Gordon, General in Balkan War Says Pentagon Hampered
NATO, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2001, at Al (discussing Gen. Wesley Clark's memoirs in
which the head of NATO forces in Yugoslavia says that the Pentagon went to great
lengths to avoid ground offensive).
186 See Walter Goodman, Fighting but Not Fighting: Step by Step in the Balkans, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 1999, at E5 (noting that the atrocities taking place in Yugoslavia turned
former "doves" into "hawks" within the Clinton administration); Raymond Bonner,
Conflict in the Balkans: The Tribunal; Tactics Were Barrier to Tops Serb's Serb's
Indictment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1999, at A5 (discussing the evidence the Clinton
Administration had of atrocities being committed in the former Yugoslavia); Marlise
Simons, Milosevic, Indicted Again Is Charged With Crimes in Croatia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
10, 2001, at A8 (noting the second Hague indictment of Slobodan Milosevic and the
evidence of atrocities that he committed in the former Yugoslavia).
187 See Paul R. Williams & Karina M. Waller, Coercive Appeasement: The Flawed
International Response to the Serbian Rogue Regime, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 825, 875
(2002) (noting NATO's public refusal to even consider ground troops as a military option,
which severely undercut the impact the bombing had in preventing Serbian brutality);
Ash, supra note 182 (stating that Pres. Clinton's original address to nation had a sentence
promising no ground troops would be used in the war); Bill McSweeney, Virtual Reality?
There's nothing virtual about killing. Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond, IRISH TIMES, Mar.
11, 2000, at 68 (stating that the use of no ground troops in Kosovo led to new age of war).
188 See Reinhold, supra note 168, at 28-29 (stating that heightened media scrutiny
has made the public increasingly unwilling to tolerate both military and civilian
casualties in war time); Cohen, supra note 185 (quoting a German political analyst who
believed the use of ground troops would change popular opinion of the war); Ash, supra
note 182 (referring to the desire to have no casualties as an American obsession).
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the war could only be maintained insofar as NATO troops were
not perishing for this humanitarian cause.18 9
The military policy to preliminarily rule out ground troops is
questionable.1 9 0 Because NATO's stated purpose of deploying
force was to combat ethnic cleansing on the ground in Kosovo,
the decision not to deploy ground troops is not tailored to the
stated humanitarian purpose. 1 9 1 It is difficult to conceive of how
bombing targets throughout Serbia, many of them hundreds of
kilometers away from Kosovo, would prevent the human rights
violations occurring on the ground, within the province of Kosovo
province. Only a military strategy that utilized a ground force
with the support of low flying planes and helicopters could
achieve the stated humanitarian end and prevent Serb forces
from committing atrocities. 192 The decision not to use ground
troops can also be criticized because it gave away NATO's
military strategy to the FRY, unthinkable in war planning. The
FRY knew that ground troops would not be deployed and were
even able to step up their campaign against ethnic Albanians
without fear of a NATO ground invasion. 193 Another element of
this policy was that while the Serb forces were being bombed,
their NATO enemy was beyond their reach.19 4 This frustration
likely caused Serb forces to act more brutally against Albanians
189 See Cohen, supra note 185 (implying that NATO strategy from the outset of the
war was not to use troops); Goodman, supra note 186 (stating Gen. Colin Powell's belief
that only war the U.S. engages in must have the support of the American people); Gordon,
supra note 185 (stating that Gen. Clark issued a secret memo which stated that the first
priority was to ensure no loss of aircraft due to "preoccupation" with loss of American life).
190 See Williams & Waller, supra note 187, at 878 (noting that Prime Minister Blair
was forthright in his assertion that ruling out ground troops would cause the air
campaign to be unsuccessful); see also Gordon, supra note 185 (noting Gen. Clark's
concern with the strategy used in Kosovo from the outset).
191 See Wippman, supra note 6, at 146 (arguing that only ground troops backed up by
low-flying aircraft could prevent Serbian atrocities); see also Gordon, supra note 185
(noting that Gen. Clark has admitted his command did not foresee the mass expulsions
that proceeded to occur in Yugoslavia once the conflict began). But see Goodman, supra
note 186 (noting that some U.S. generals believe the use of troops would amount to U.S.
soldiers acting as policeman, a job which the general's believed the soldiers were
unqualified to do).
192 See Wippman, supra note 6, at 146-48 (believing that U.S. strategy was not
sufficient to achieve stated goals); see also Gordon, supra note 185 (noting the debates
NATO allies had regarding the bombing strategy).
193 See Kelly supra note 181 (insinuating that bombing increased brutality); see also
Ash, supra note 182 (implying that rate of atrocities increased after the bombing had
started).
194 See Ash, supra note 182 (discussing the high altitude that U.S. fighter jets flew
at); Kelly, supra note 181 (arguing that the U.S. high altitude bombing did more harm
than good).

2003]

A REJECTION OFTHE KOSOVO PRECEDENT

whom they perceived as NATO allies, and who were the only
95
enemy they could reach.1
4. The Use of Depleted Uranium
NATO released that its U.S. A-10 Warthog assault aircraft
fired 31,000 rounds of ammunition consisting of depleted
uranium (DU) in Yugoslavia. 19 6 DU is used for its efficiency in
destroying enemy tanks, however, it possesses radioactive and
toxic properties known to cause severe adverse health
consequences to civilian populations and military troops who
come into contact with it.197 When DU particles are released into
the air they can enter the body though inhalation, hand-to-mouth
contact, via contaminated vehicles, or in food and water
contaminated with DU dust.19 8 Once in the body, it remains in
the liver, kidney and bones for years, causing cancer, genetic
deformities,
herpes,
leukemia,
and
severe
immunodeficiencies.1 99 NATO denies these dangerous effects of DU
despite the call by leading scientists to ban its use, and evidence
linking the use of DU in the Gulf War to disturbing increases in
cancer rates of U.S. veterans and Iraqi soldiers who fought in
that war. 20 0 After the bombing in Yugoslavia, increased amounts
195 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 26 (stating NATO openly supported KLA attacks
and used them to lure Serb forces into the open where they could be bombed); Kelly, supra
note 181 (arguing that more brutal attacks were incurred because of the bombing); see
also Ash, supra note 182 (stating that United States did not expect the rate at which
Milosevic was able to carry out mass expulsions once the war began).
196 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 399-05 (noting how much depleted uranium was
used in Yugoslavia); Alex Kirby, Pentagon Confirms Depleted Uranium Use, BBC News,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2Ihi/science/nature/337855.stm (May 7, 1999); see also
Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 3.5 (stating how much depleted uranium was used
by NATO forces).
197 See Kirby, supra note 194; see also Colum Lynch, WHO Team Will Study a
Weapon's Toll in Iraq, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2001, at A20 (noting that studies were
conducted to determine whether depleted uranium shells increase cancer rates); David B.
Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, That's Why They Call it War, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2003, at
B4 (noting that depleted uranium has serious health side effects).
198 See Howard Schneider, WHO to Study Health Effects of Depleted Uranium in Iraq,
WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2001, at A20 (discussing how depleted uranium operates); Future
Looks Bleak for Iraq's Fragile Environment: Damage Sustained by Kuwait during the
First Gulf War gives some indication of he possible effects of war in Iraq - on the desert,
water supplies and biodiversity, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 15, 2003, at 12 (discussing how
depleted uranium tipped bombs operate).
199 See Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 3.5 (noting these adverse health effects);
see also Lynch, supra note 197 (fearing that increased cancer and kidney disease rates in
Iraq are caused by depleted uranium shelling during the Cold War).
200 See Campaign Against Depleted Uranium, Depleted Uranium in Iraq and Gulf
War Veterans, CADU News 7 (Spring 2001) availableat http://www.cadu.org.uk/info/
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of radioactive air pollution were detected, and an unpublished
report for the European Commission stated that NATO's use of
DU was "the most dangerous of the cancer-causing and toxic
substances released during the bombing." 2 01 A British scientist
calculated that NATO's use of DU would eventually cause 10,000
additional civilian deaths from cancer. 20 2 Thus, any military
advantages achieved by the use of DU seem severely offset by the
consequences this chemical agent has on civilians.
5. The Use of Cluster Bombs
Throughout the bombing campaign, NATO dropped over
330,000 cluster bombs over the FRY.203 A cluster bomb is a bomb
dispenser containing many small bomblets. 20 4 These small
bomblets are released and dispersed well before impact with the
earth. 20 5 Cluster bombs are considered an "area weapon" because
they explode into thousands of tiny little bomblets and spread
veterans/7_l.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2003) (noting various harmful effects on American
troops during Gulf War); see also Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 3.5 (noting that
use of depleted uranium is not prohibited by international law); Paddy Colligan,
Campaign to Weapons: Soldiers, Doctors Testify on Effects of DU, Depleted Uranium
Education Project, available at http://www.iacenter.org/du-banconf.htm (last visited Sept.
9, 2003) (noting the harmful effects of DU and its effects on military personnel).
201 Medenica, supra note 5, at 403-04 (describing the dangers associated with DU);
see also Graham N. Greene, Kosovo Fallout: Canadian Personnel May Be Exposed to
Radiation Contamination,NAT'L POST, July 26, 1999, at A14 (detailing harmful effects of
DU).
202 See Alex Kirby, Depleted Uranium Threatens Balkan Cancer Epidemic, BBC
News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/408122.stm (July 30, 1999);
Richard Norton-Taylor, Uranium Shells Warning for Kosovo Alternative Maybe: MOD
Accused
of
Hiding
Truth,
GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED,
available
at
http://www.guardian.co.ukluranium/story/0,7369,419940,00.html (July 31, 1999) (noting
findings of Roger Coghill who believes there will be 10,000 additional deaths for depleted
uranium); see also Christina Lamb, Thousands of Kosovo Peacekeepers To Be Tested For
D.U. Poisoning, available at http://www.rense.com/gernerall6/koso.htm (Dec. 31, 2000)
(noting increasing deaths in Kosovo).
203 See McDonnell, supra note 126, at 52 (discussing NATO's reliance on cluster
bombing); see also Herthel, supra note 161, at 231 (noting the heavy use of cluster bombs
in Yugoslavia); Wiebe, supra note 103, at 129 (noting the high use of cluster bombs in
Yugoslavian conflict).
204 See Robert A. Coe & Michael N. Schmitt, Fighter Ops for Shoe Clerks, 42 A.F. L.
REV. 49, 69 (1997) (discussing bomblets in cluster bombs); Herthel, supra note 161, at 235
(discussing the components of cluster bombs); McDonnell, supra note 126, at 44 (noting a
cluster bomb's use of tiny "bomblets").
205 See McDonnell, supra note 126, at 44 (stating that exploding them prior to impact
increases the range of the bomb); see also Matthew Lippman, Aerial Attacks on Civilians
and the Humanitarian Law of War: Technology and Terror from World War I to
Afghanistan, 33 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 32 (2002) (noting the large area cluster bomb's can
reach); Medenica, supra note 5, at 395-96 (discussing the wide range cluster bombs can
reach).
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over a very large geographical area. 2 06 Each small cluster bomb
contains anywhere from 10 to 500 pieces of shrapnel, called
bomblets. 2 07 Because the bomblets spread over such a wide
distance, they are nearly impossible to control so their use by
NATO caused extensive civilian damage whenever a cluster
bomb landed in an urban area. 2 08 Many bomblet packages also
tend to remain unexploded on the ground, where they virtually
act as unexploded landmines. 20 9 Especially dangerous is the fact
that these bomblets are the size of a soda can and are brightly
colored yellow with a red stripe. 2 10 Children are often attracted
to them because the bright colors make them look like toys, and
when picked up the result is often death or amputation. 2 11 It is
estimated that 11,000 unexploded bomblets remain within the
FRY.212
206 See McDonnell, supra note 126, at 41-42 (stating that cluster bombs spread over
an area up to 5 football fields); see also Hayden, supra note 165, at 552 (describing the
"lethal radius" of cluster bombs); Medenica, supra note 5, at 396 (discussing how each
bomblet can reach a radius between 250 and 500 feet).
207 See McDonnell, supra note 126, at 44-45 (stating that the United States Air Force
preferred the CBU-87B cluster bomb, which contains 202 bomblets); see also Wiebe, supra
note 103, at 89 (discussing use of ball bearings along with other shrapnel in cluster
bombs); UN to Clear Coalition Cluster Bombs, UN Integrated Regional Information
Network, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/afghan/2002/OlO2cluste
r.htm (Jan. 2, 2002) (stating that cluster bombs, "are designed to fragment at high
velocity into hundreds of pieces of shrapnel").
208 See McDonnell, supra note 126, at 41-42 (noting that cluster bombs also inflict
civilian casualties because a high percentage of the bomblets are duds that do not explode,
but remain active essentially acting like a land mine); Richard Norton-Taylor, NATO
ClusterBombs Kill 15 in Hospital and Crowded Market, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,298422,00.html (May 8, 1999)
(noting destruction in urban setting using cluster bombs); see also Lippman, supra note
205, at 50 (noting the increased risk of attacking urban targets with cluster bombs).
209 See Herthel, supra note 161, at 249 (discussing how unexploded cluster bombs
create a hazardous situation because the bombs can not determine who is a combatant or
who is an innocent bystander); Laursen, supra note 6, at 778 (discussing unexploded
cluster bombs left in Serbia and Kosovo); McDonnell, supra note 126, at 42 (noting the
danger an unexploded cluster bomb poses to civilians).
210 See Herthel, supra note 161, at 265 (noting the dangers of "duds"); Lippman,
supra note 205, at 60 (discussing how unexploded bomblets in Afghanistan are similar to
food packets being dropped by coalition forces); McDonnell, supra note 126, at 42 (stating
the bomblets appear as a high tech toy).
211 See McDonnell, supra note 126, at 50 (stating that aside from nuclear weapons,
biological weapons and poison gas, cluster bombs are perhaps the most dangerous
weapons in modern warfare); Wiebe, supra note 103, at 114 (noting how the shape and
colors of unexploded cluster bombs, "make them irresistible to children and adults alike");
see also Christoper M. Van de Kieft, Note, UncertainRisk: The United States Military and
the InternationalCriminal Court, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2325, 2361 n.288 (2002) (noting
similarity between soda cans and unexploded cluster bombs).
212 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 395-99 (noting amount of unexploded bomblets);
see also McDonnell, supra note 126, at 59 (discussing numbers of unexploded bomblets
left in Kosovo); Stannard, supra note 69, at 631 (discussing large amount of unexploded
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6. Environmental Damage
Widespread environmental damages resulted from the
bombing of oil refineries and chemical factories in the FRY.213
Despite the obvious military gains from bombing such targets,
the severe long-term damage inflicted on the natural
2 14
environment calls the legitimacy of these targets into question.
Because these industrial targets are typically located in highlypopulated areas, toxic pollutants and contaminants released into
the atmosphere can cause widespread harm when released into
the groundwater.2 1 5 The extent of this impact on the future of the
FRY's natural environment is yet to be calculated.
Considering all the above factors, NATO appeared to have
placed greater importance on military objectives than on their
duty to minimize civilian casualties. 2 16 Not all civilian deaths in
times of war are unlawful; 2 17 indeed, one should expect some
civilian casualties. However, the choice of military means that
disproportionately impacts civilians must be avoided. 2 18 In
bomblets).
213 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 413; Aaron Schwabach, Environmental Damage
Resulting From the NATO Military Action Against Yugoslavia, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
117, 119 (2000) (discussing the destruction of the Pancevo chemical and fertilizer factory
complex in Yugoslavia); see also U.N. Env't Programme & U.N. Ctr. For Human
Settlement, The Kosovo Conflict: Consequences for the Environment & Human Settlements
(1999), available at http://www.grid.unep.chfbtf/final/index.html (last visited Sept. 8,
2002) (noting various environmental disasters that occurred along with bombings in
Kosovo).
214 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 414 (questioning the excessive force on nonmilitary targets); see also Reinhold, supra note 168, at 3 (noting criticizism of NATO for
bombing factories and refineries); Schwabach, supra note 213, at 118 (noting how the
Yugoslavia environmental damage was not necessary, but rather incidental).
215 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 414-15; Alex Kirby, Danube Pollution Warning,
BBC News, availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid
446000/446226.stm (Sept. 14, 1999); see also Meredith DuBarry Huston, Wartime
Environmental Damages: Financing the Cleanup, 23 U.PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 899, 924
(2002) (opining that the use of uranium depleted weapons may have also contaminated
drinking water in Kosovo).
216 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 395 (discussing the high priority military
objectives took in Kosovo); Reinhold, supra note 168, at 3 (noting heavy criticism of NATO
for bombing civilian targets); Voon, supra note 95, at 87 (criticizing NATO for not properly
distinguishing military and civilian targets).
217 See Stannard, supra note 69, at 619 (noting that civilian casualties can be
expected during war); see also Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 2 (noting some
civilian deaths are expected in war); Amnesty International, The Laws of War and the
Protection of Civilians, available at http://www.amnesty.ie/about/lawl.shtml (last visited
Sept. 8, 2003) (noting that not all civilian deaths are unlawful).
218 See Stannard, supra note 69, at 619 (discussing the disproportionate impact
standard); see also Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 2 (noting the proportionality test
must be followed); Roger Normand & Christoph Wilcke, Human Rights, Sanctions, and
Terrorist Threats: The United Nations Sanctions Against Iraq, 11 TRANSNAT'L L. &
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choosing high altitude aerial bombing, the use of depleted
uranium, the use of cluster bombs and the decision not to risk the
lives of ground troops, NATO inevitably shifted all these risks
from their military personnel to Yugoslav civilians. 2 19 NATO's
claim that the bombing campaign was the "most precise and
lowest-collateral damage air campaign in history" 22 0 seems to be
mere rhetoric in light of the above stated facts. Time and again,
NATO has apologized for the "collateral damage" inflicted by its
warplanes. 2 2 1 Yet, as suggested, NATO military planners could
have conducted the war in ways that were safer to both Albanian
and Serb civilians. 22 2

CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 341 (2001) (noting "disproportionate impact" standard and how it
would have to be met to sanction Iraq for violating laws of war).
219 See Voon, supra note 95, at 89-90 (stating that there were approximately 500
confirmed civilians deaths and 6,000 wounded by the NATO air campaign despite the use
of high tech and sophisticated weaponry); see also Falk, supra note 17, at 851-52 (quoting
Robert Fisk's opinion that the strategies implemented by NATO in Kosovo, "killed
hundreds of innocent Serb civilians... while being too cowardly to risk a single NATO
life in defense of the poor and weak for whom it meretriciously claimed to be fighting" and
mentioning that the high altitude bombing caused severe damage to the water supply,
electricity systems, caused severe pollution, and was still expanded to use cluster bombs
and depleted uranium); Herthel, supra note 161, at 242 (narrating and citing that on May
8, 1999, at least two cluster bombs missed their targets and "landed in two residential
areas of Nis in Serbia, around the market place near the center of town and near a
hospital several blocks away" killing fourteen and injuring thirty civilians).
220 Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 1.
221 See McDonnell, supra note 126, at 77 (stating that the phrase "collateral damage"
is an Orwellian euphemism for civilian casualties); see also Richard Gwyn, NATO Has
Lost Its Moral Compass, TORONTO STAR, May 12, 1999 (making note of what Mary
Robinson, United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, had observed after the
Kosovo bombings "[NATO] remains sole judge of what is or is not acceptable to bomb").
See generally Marko Djuranovic, America's Obsession with the Sound Bite, UNIV. WIRE,
Nov. 10, 1999 (taking note that "As the war progressed, civilian deaths caused by NATO
bombs were at first reported as 'collateral damage.' Later, NATO officials no longer even
apologized for such 'expected errors"').
222 See Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 1; see also Wieb, supra note 103, at 126
(noting that some states believe that "equipping bomblets with self-destruct and/or selfdeactivate mechanisms" would cause them to be safer to civilians, and also making a
point that only cluster bombs leave an unidentifiable number of live bombs, which can
explode at any moment after the intended bombing, causing severe injuries to
unsuspecting civilians); William Pfaff, NATO Can't Justify this Cowardly Strategy, BALT.
SUN, May 13, 1999, at 17A (stating that NATO's conduct in the Kosovo conflict
demonstrated an "assumption that the lives of NATO's soldiers and airmen are more
valuable than the lives of Yugoslavs"); Paul Watson & Lisa Getter, Response to Terror;
Civilians in Danger; Silent Peril Lies in Wait for Afghanistan's People; Weapons:
Unexploded bomblets' toll on civilians has renewed controversy over their use, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2001, at Al (comparing the military value of cluster bombs on masses of troops, to
the lethal effects of cluster bombs on civilians beyond the conflict in which they were
utilized, and quoting William Arkin, a former Army intelligence analyst who studied the
bombs as having said, "Clearly, cluster bombs have shown to be a greater hazard to
civilians than virtually any other weapon that is legal").
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V. THE CHARGES AGAINST NATO

Scrutiny of NATO's operation and its impact on civilians will
only benefit the cause of human rights for any future military
conflicts. 22 3 Non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty
International (AI)224 and Human Rights Watch (HRW)225 are
devoted to the protection of international human rights. The role
that these groups play are especially important because they
derive no funding from governments and are not subject to
internal political pressure, so they can publish their findings
without internal pressure. 2 26
On June 7, 2000, a report published by AI accused NATO of
committing war crimes in its bombing campaign over the FRY.227
223 See Laursen, supra note 6, at 776 (imploring the reader to consider NATO actions
in the context of WWII aerial bombardments, at least indicating NATO's conduct in the
Kosovo conflict was a measure to use in the future, impliedly to future war conduct with
reference to impact on civilians); see also Burton, supra note 32, at 62 (commenting
proudly on NATO's efforts in Kosovo, yet highlighting that "[iun the future, the United
Nations should consider establishing specific criteria for such interventions, to prevent
potential abuses."); Van de Kieft, supra note 211, at 2360 (noting that there may be a
"significant effect on future military operations" because of NATO's conduct, for example,
use of depleted uranium on ammunition tips may aid in cutting armor, but cause
leukemia and cancer to troops and civilians, as well as have the potential to contaminate
drinking water).
224 See Laursen, supra note 6, at 772 (noting that Amnesty International promotes
adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights along with other internationally
accepted instruments that promote human rights); see also Jack Healey, Confronting the
Challenge of Realizing Human Rights Now: Final Keynote: You Can Make A Difference, 34
How. L.J. 82, 85 (1991) (positing by the executive director of Amnesty International that
one of its purposes is to attempt to be a voice for those who would otherwise be submitted
to torture without chance of being heard; and making a difference in that effort); Anthony
C. Infanti, Spontaneous Tax Coordination: On Adopting a Comparative Approach to
Reforming the U.S. International Tax Regime, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1105, 1181
(2002) (referring to Amnesty International as an NGO - a non-governmental, not-forprofit organization).
225 See Johann Hari, If this War with Iraq is to be a Moral War, It must be fought in a
Moral Way, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 7, 2003 (noting that Human Rights Watch's purpose is
"not to stop the war, but to make sure the war does as little damage as possible to the
civilian population of Iraq"); Yaman Akdeniz, Anonymity, Democracy, and Cyberspace;
Part V: Democratic Process and Nonpublic Politics, Soc. RES., Mar. 22, 2002, at 223
(citing HRW with AI as organizations dealing with human rights abuses worldwide). See
generally Human Rights Watch, About HRW, available at http://www.hrw.org/about/ (last
visited Sept. 8, 2002) (stating that Human Rights Watch fights for the respect of
international human rights law and expose violations).
226 See Laursen, supra note 6, at 772 (indicating that organizations such as Al and
HRW use information campaigns as a formidable method of reaching their goals); see also
Gerald Steinberg, Propaganda Has Taken Over From Humanitarianism,AUSTL. FIN.
REV., June 7, 2002, at 75 (purporting that organizations such as Al and HRW do actually
receive funding from governments, but without any explicit allegation that such funding
carries political pressure). But see False Claims Will Not Deter Amnesty, AUSTL. FIN.
REV., June 18, 2002, at 66 (citing the President of Amnesty International as remarking
"Amnesty International accepts no funding from any government").
227 See Amnesty Report, supra note 151, at § 4 (concluding that if NATO more closely
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The report names three types of war crimes that it alleges NATO
committed. The first category is for attacks against civilian
targets, such as against the Serbian state television and radio
station in Belgrade. 22 8 AI believed that such attacks against
civilian objects violated Article 52(1) of Protocol I of the Geneva
Convention (1977) because the military gain was not proportional
to the civilian loss of life.229 The second category is for NATO's
daylight attacks that killed civilians on bridges. 2 30 Al concluded
that NATO failed to suspend attacks even after it became clear
from cockpit monitors that the missiles would strike civilians. 23 1
According to Al, these attacks violate Article 57(2)(b) because the
anticipated military advantage did not outweigh the loss of
civilian life. 23 2 Third, Al accused NATO of taking insufficient
precautions to minimize loss of civilian life in choosing to bomb at
followed the law of war, civilian deaths could have been reduced); see also Reinhold, supra
note 168, at 3 n.6 (highlighting Al's accusation against NATO for war crimes in the
Kosovo campaign).
228 See Van de Kieft, supra note 211, at n.273 (highlighting the bombing of Belgrade
headquarters of Radio Television Serbia on April 23, 1999, which was condemned by
Amnesty International as "a deliberate attack on a civilian target"); see also Hayden,
supra note 165, at 556-57, n.49 (commenting that Radio Television Serbia (RTS) was
clearly a civilian target and that AI called the NATO attack a war crime); Mandel, supra
note 19, at 116 (stating "the attack on the headquarters of Serbian state radio and
television (RTS), NATO launched a direct attack on a civilian object, killing 16 civilians").
229 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 116 (noting that "the attacks on civilian targets
such as the Belgrade RTS radio and television building were contrary to Article 52(1) of
Protocol I of the Geneva Convention (1977), and made criminal by Article 2 of the
Tribunal Statute."); Meyer, supra note 26, at 166 (citing AI's statement that "the attack
on the [station] violated the prohibition to attack civilian objects contained in Article 52(1)
and therefore constitutes a war crime"); Walker, supra note 55, at 81 n.122 (2002)
(highlighting that 52(1) prohibits attacks upon civilian objects).
230 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 116 (listing the bridges upon which there was
"NATO killing of civilians... (Grdelica, Luzane, and Varvarin")); Sean D. Murphy,
ContemporaryPracticeof the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 94 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 677, 691 (2000) (quoting AI as enumerating the "attacks, including the Grdelica
railroad bridge, the automobile bridge in Luzane, and Varvarin bridge"); Voon, supra note
162, at 1100-02 (giving a detailed account of the events of the "military" attack on the
Passenger Train at Grdelica Gorge using the Leskovac railway bridge in eastern Serbia).
231 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 116 (positing that "NATO failed to suspend attacks
even after it became clear that it would cause loss of civilian life"); Murphy, supra note
230, at 691 (citing Al's statement that "NATO forces failed to suspend their attack after it
was evident that they had struck civilians"); Anne-Marie Slaughter & William BurkeWhite, An International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 16 n.76 (2002)
(recognizing a problem with the bombing of bridges because of the likelihood of civilian
casualties).
232 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 116 (opining that the attacks were "excessive in
relation to the concrete military advantage to be anticipated, and in contravention of
Article 57(2)(b)"); Murphy, supra note 230, at 691 (stating Al's indication that these
attacks were "in contravention of Article 57(2)(b)"); see also McDonnell, supra note 126, at
n.22 (pointing out that there was no "definite military advantage" for NATO in targeting
the bridges).
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above 15,000 feet and for deploying cluster bombs, which make
"full adherence to international humanitarian law virtually
impossible."

2 33

HRW documented ninety separate incidents during the
campaign in which civilians were killed.234 The report stated that
thirty-three civilians were killed from attacks against targets in
highly populated urban areas. 23 5 Although HRW found no
evidence of war crimes, it concluded that NATO violated
international humanitarian law, including principles of
proportionality under Protocol 1.236 Civilian deaths during
Operation Allied Force, says HRW "occurred as a result of
decisions regarding target and weapons selection." 23 7 Finally, it
called for a formal investigation.
Unfortunately, a special
committee from The Office of the Prosecution (OTP) of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) reviewed NATO's operations but determined that the
facts did not justify any formal investigation of the NATO
operation. 2 38 The ICTY concluded "that there was insufficient
evidence of intentional criminal acts to justify further
233 Mandel, supra note 19, at 116 (stating that "Third.... in bombings that killed...
civilians .... insufficient precautions were taken to minimize civilian casualties, contrary
to 57(2)(a)" and the 15,000 foot NATO bombing tactic made "full adherence to
international humanitarian law virtually impossible"); Murphy, supra note 230, at 691692 (quoting AI "In... the attacks on displaced civilians in Djakovica and Korisa,
insufficient precautions were taken to minimize civilian casualties" and that 15,000 foot
altitude bombing by aircraft made "full adherence to international humanitarian law
virtually impossible").
234 See Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, Feb. 2000,
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2003) (providing
detailed statistics regarding the 90 incident reports on civilians casualties from the
Kosovo-Operation Allied Force attacks) [hereinafter "Civilian Deaths"]; Murphy, supra
note 230, at 127 n.1 (referencing the 90 NATO attacks documented by HRW); see also
McDonnell, supra note 126, at 98-99 (Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented ninety
confirmed incidents in which civilians died from NATO bombing).
235 See Civilian Deaths, supra note 234.
236 Id. See Laursen, supra note 6, at n.26 (comparing Al's report accusing NATO of
war crimes to where "Human Rights Watch found 'no evidence of war crimes"'); Hayden,
supra note 165, at 569 (stating that "NATO violated international humanitarian law,"
although it prefaced this conclusion with the interesting distinction that it had "found no
evidence of war crimes").
237 Civilian Deaths, supra note 234.
238 See Wippman, supra note 6, at 147 (indicating that the ICTY did not find any
grounds to justify pursuing prosecution of the NATO operations); ICTY, Final Report to
the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign
Against
the
Federal
Republic
of
Yugoslavia,
available
at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato0613OO.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2003); Lippman,
supra note 205, at 54 (commenting that ICTY found a "lack of credible information" to
justify pursuing prosecution).
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investigation." 2 39 The decision not to investigate faced much
criticism because the protection of human rights in times of war
2
could only benefit from such an investigation. 40
A. NATO's Motives
Despite reservations about the military means used in NATO's
bombing campaign, some scholars have hesitated to question
NATO's stated humanitarian purpose in deploying force. 241 They
point to the lack of resources in the Kosovo as proof that NATO
had no other motives than humanitarianism in intervening. 2 4 2
However, Professor Chomsky suggests this simplistic argument
demonstrates a lack of understanding of both history and policy,
namely because the Balkans has important strategic value. 2 4 3
Some scholars suggest that the U.S. has had a long history of
justifying war as humanitarian despite reality being to the
contrary. 2 44 Particularly compelling is the fact that Turkey, a
239 See Wippman, supra note 6, at 147.
240 See Laursen, supra note 6, at 771-72 (describing the public and academic outcry
for the investigation of NATO war crimes); Jelena Pejic, Legal Perspectives and Analyses
the Yugoslavia Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Shaky Start, 25 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1, 3 n.6 (2001) (indicating that the failure to investigate caused irreparable harm to
NATO's reputation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); see also Charles Trueheart,
U.N. Tribunal Rejects Calls for Probe of NATO; No Kosovo War Crimes Found, WASH.
POST, June 3, 2000, at A9 (reporting on the chief prosecutor's decision to follow the
committee's recommendation not to initiate an investigation).
241 See Lobel, supra note 103, at 27-30 (elucidating the grounds for humanitarian
intervention in Kosovo and noting the inconsistency in U.S. application of the rationale);
Wippman, supra note 6, at 149-50 (indicating that the casualties in humanitarian actions
should not dissuade the U.S. from engaging in such actions). But see Chomsky, supra note
17, at 136 (rejecting acceptance of the stated humanitarian purpose).
242 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 136 (pointing out that Kosovo's lack of resources is
a common argument to justify the humanitarian motives of the bombing campaign); see
also Judith A. Miller, NATO's Use of Force in the Balkans, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 91, 99
(2001) (stating that NATO was not seeking to exploit any natural resources in Kosovo);
America's Double-Edged Sword, BOSTON GLOBE, July 5, 1999, at A14 (quoting Vaclav
Havel as stating, "This is probably the first war that has not been waged in the name of
national interests but rather in the name of principles and values. Kosovo has no oil fields
to be coveted...").
243 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 136-37 (advancing some Western advantages in
establishing a foothold in the Balkans); see also Kader Asmal, International Law and
Practice:Dealing With the Past in the South African Experience, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1211, 1219 (2000) (describing Chomsky's contentions that the war was a means of
asserting U.S. power and dominance in the region); Maxine Marcus, Humanitarian
Intervention Without Borders: Belligerent Occupation or Colonization?, 25 HOUS. J. INT'L
L. 99, 132-33 (2002) (elucidating humanitarian intervention in Kosovo as a contemporary
means of colonization).
244 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 101 (explaining the reasons for not believing in
asserted humanitarian interest); see also Bilder, supra note 166, at 163 (pointing out the
United States' unfortunate support of regimes that abused human rights in Vietnam,
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NATO member, has committed serious human rights violations
against the Kurds, including ethnic cleansing, torture, laws
banning their language and disappearances. 245 The Council of
Europe and the European Court of Human Rights have found
Turkey "responsible for burning villages, inhuman and degrading
treatment" and maltreatment by security forces. 2 46 Professor
Chomsky questions NATO's stated humanitarian use of force in
Kosovo while some of Europe's worst human rights violations
were occurring in their own jurisdiction. 2 47 NATO also remained
silent while Russia stepped up its operations in Chechnya a few
months after the bombing. 2 48 In Chechnya, just as in Kosovo, a
ruling country was using military force to maintain its grip over
a province of different ethnic and religious makeup. 2 49 Also,
Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Indonesia); Voon, supra note 95, at 79 (stating
that the U.S. has maintained an inconsistent position on human rights because at the
same time that it declares the inviolability of human rights, it refuses to ratify important
treaties promoting human rights such as the one banning landmines or submitting to the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court).
245 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 102 (indicating that the Turks have killed over
30,000 Kurds); see also McDonnell, supra note 126, at 37 n.14 (elucidating the sources
chronicling Turkey's humanitarian abuses); Amnesty International, Turkey: An end to
torture and impunity is overdue! (2001), available at http://web.amnesty.org/
ai.nsf/IndexIELR440722001?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES\TJRKEY
(last visited
Sept. 8, 2003); Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Human Rights Developments, available at
http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/europe/turkey.html
(2001) (last visited Sept. 8, 2003)
(elucidating that although the law banning Kurdish was eventually repealed in 1989,
restrictions on its use continue, including bans on Kurdish radio and television, the use of
Kurdish in schools and advertisements, and giving children Kurdish names); Chomsky,
supra note 17, at 52 (detailing the various forms that Turkey's repression of the Kurds
has taken).
246 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 52 (chronicling Turkey's human rights violations).
See generally Frank Hoffmeister, International Decisions: Cyprus v. Turkey. App. No.
25781/94, 96 AM. J .INT'L L. 445 (2002) (providing in-depth detail of the European Court
of Human Rights decision in this case).
247 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 52 (stating Turkey's human rights violations are
one of the sticking points in Turkey's drive for European Union membership); see also
Lobel, supra note 103, at 28 (providing that the position towards Kosovo is inconsistent
with the lack of action taken against Turkey's human rights violations); McDonnell, supra
note 126, at 37 n.14 (indicating Turkey's human rights violations).
248 See Jonathan I. Charney, Self-Determination: Chechnya, Kosovo, and East Timor,
34 VAND. J. TRANSNT'L L. 455, 458-59 (2001) (providing various rational for the
discrepancy international treatment of the situations in Kosovo and Chechnya);
Kissinger, supra note 18, at 257; John J. Merriam, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian
Intervention, 33 CASE. W. RES. J. INT'L L. 111, 152 (2001) (indicating the U.S. refusal to
intervene in Chechnya as illustrative of the inconsistency in application of the
humanitarian intervention rationale).
249 See Charney, supra note 248, at 460 n.18 (providing a comparison of the sources of
the conflicts in Chechnya and Kosovo); Duncan B. Hollis, Accountability in ChechnyaAddressing Internal Matters with Legal and Political International Norms, 36 B.C. L.
REV. 793, 798-99 (1995) (indicating the ethnic and religious differences that led to the
Russian intervention). See generally Yavus Akhmadov et al., Islam in the North
Caucasus,26 J. SOC. POL. & ECON. STUD. 569 (2001) (describing the history of Chechnya's
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Russia's Chechyan campaign was even more brutal and on a
larger scale than the Serb's suppression of the Albanians, yet
250
NATO did not respond.
B. NATO's Continued Relevance
Now that NATO has lost its original aim - to counter the
threat from the Soviet Union, the relevance of the Alliance must
25 1 NATO
seized its 5 0th
necessarily come into question.
Anniversary summit in Washington, in the midst of the bombing
campaign, to show the world that it has re-invented itself to stay
relevant to the 21st century. 25 2 Scholars have asserted that
NATO seized the Kosovo opportunity to demonstrate that the
Alliance is still relevant to modern affairs. 2 53 In this task to
remain relevant, NATO has converted itself from a defensive
alliance into an offensive power. 2 54 Furthermore, some concluded
Muslim roots and its ethnic differences).
250 See Doug Bandow, A Foreign Policy for a Republic, Not an Empire, 21 WHITTIER
L. REV. 353, 367 (1999) (indicating that the civilian casualties in Chechnya far
outweighed those in Kosovo); Kissenger, supra note 18, at 257 (noting that NATO also
evaded the imperative to act on humanitarian principles in Sierra Leone, where the
murder and atrocities were even more widespread than in Kosovo or Chechnya); Johanna
Nichols, The Chechen Refugees, 18 BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 241, 244 (2000) (indicating that
most human rights estimate that 50,000 civilians were killed during the war between
Russia and Chechnya).
251 See Rep. Bob Barr, Protecting National Sovereignty in an Era of International
Meddling: An Increasingly Difficult Task, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 299, 309 (2002)
(indicating that the conflict occurred when NATO was seeking relevance in the post-Cold
War era); W. Kent Davis, Swords into Plowshares the Dangerous Politicization of the
Military in the Post-Cold War Era, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 61, 82 (1998) (stating that NATO
was formed to counter the threat from the Soviet Union); see also Michael M. Gallagher,
Comment, Declaring Victory and Getting out [Of Europe]: Why the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Should Disband, 25 Hous. J. INT'L L. 341, 341-52 (2003) (elucidating the
purpose and the struggle for continuing relevance in post-Cold War era).
252 See Simma, supra note 38 (indicating that reinvention of NATO after the end of
the Cold War was important to the continuing relevance of NATO); see also Falk, supra
note 17, at 851 (stating that NATO was under pressure to maintain its relevance in the
post Cold War setting); Judith A. Miller, Reflections on National Security and
InternationalLaw Issues During the Clinton Administration, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 219, 224
(2002) (indicating that the Kosovo bombing was a means of reasserting NATO's
relevance); Smith, supra note 59, at 3 (noting that the bombings in Kosovo coincided with
the fiftieth anniversary of NATO and its attempts to assert its continuing relevance).
253 See Bilder, supra note 166, at 163 (providing that the less altruistic motives of
credibility and self-preservation were at the heart of NATO's involvement in Kosovo);
Wedgwood, supra note 144, at 399 (indicating that maintaining the credibility of NATO
was one of the stated goals of the Kosovo intervention); John C. Yoo, UN Wars, US War
Powers, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 355, 369 (2000) (indicating that if NATO had not become
involved, its relevance and credibility would have been open to critical attacks signaling
its demise).
254 See Buchanan, supra note 19 (asserting that NATO was once an alliance of free
nations formed to thwart any invasion by Stalin into Western Europe but has become a
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that NATO had no choice but prove to Belgrade that its threats
were not empty. 255 A European diplomat close to NATO stated
that inaction in Kosovo would have critically diminished the
alliance's credibility.256
C. Test New Weaponry

The Wall Street Journalstated that the Kosovo war would be a
huge stimulus for military production and sales. 25 7 The most
lucrative contracts go to major U.S. construction companies, who
expected to rebuild the bridges, buildings and roads that were
destroyed in the FRY during the bombing. 2 58 Hence, the view has
been advanced that the war must be looked at with suspicion
because it greatly benefited the military-industrial complex of
the West. 2 5 9 This view sees the bombing of the FRY merely as a
humanitarian pretext to test new weaponry. 2 60
neoimperialist bloc that invaded a small nation like Serbia in the name of democracy and
human rights); see also Hayden, supra note 165, at 570-71 (indicating that NATO action
was offensive rather than defensive, although it maintained the language of defensive
action against genocide); Kissinger, supra note 18, at 263 (stating the NATO demands
marked a shift in the Alliance's policy from a defensive union to an "insistence on war").
255 See Voon, supra note 95, at 79 (2002) (stating that some have asserted that one of
NATO's motives for the bombing was to keep the Alliance relevant); see also Chomsky,
supra note 17, at 135 (quoting a commentator who stated "fi]f there is no NATO victory
over Serbia, there will no longer be a NATO"); Yoo, supra note 253, at 369 (providing if
NATO did not reassert its relevance and credibility, it would have been open to critical
attacks signaling its demise).
256 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 134 (noting NATO leaders publicly noted that
credibility was an issue); see also Wippman, supra note 6, at 140 (indicating that various
commentator have determined that the real reason for NATO involvement in Kosovo was
founded upon credibility concerns); Mandel, supra note 19, at 106 (declaring the need to
invent a new role as a purpose of NATO's involvement in Kosovo).
257 See Anne Marie Squeo, For Defense Sales, War Is Potent Ammo-Combat Records
Help Missiles, Jets Fly Off the Shelf, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1999, at B1 (stating "In the
defense business, there is no better showcase than a war, and America's major defense
companies are rapidly incorporating the one in Kosovo into sales pitches."); see also
Chomsky, supra note 17, at 138 (citing the Wall Street Journal as stating that Raytheon
alone expected that the war would bring in over a billion dollars of orders); Kosovo: An
Uneasy Peace, BBC News, availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/englishlstatic/nato-gallery/
nato-l.stm (last visited Mar. 31, 2003) (stating that America's B-2 Bombers, which cost
$812 million each, were used for the first time in the war against the FRY).
258 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 138-39 (estimating that reconstruction contracts
could amount to $2 to $3.5 billion); Alan Cowell, British Industry Seeking Share of Balkan
Rebuilding Work, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 15, 1999, at C4 (indicating that the likely cost to
rebuild infrastructure such as power supply installations, roads, bridges, and will range
between $30 and $50 billion); David Gow, UK firms in race for Kosovo contracts
Rebuilding: Task force bids to win orders worth up to pounds 30bn, GUARDIAN, Jun. 19,
1999, at 4 (indicating that the contracts for the rebuilding of Kosovo could amount to £30
billion).
259 See Linda Killian, Kosovo's Hidden Costs, AM. SPECTATOR, July 1999, at 54
(indicating that military contractors gained from the $15 billion increases in military
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VI. THE AFTERMATH OF THE BOMBING

The NATO bombing finally ceased on June 10, 1999 when
NATO and Serbian authorities signed the Kosovo Peace
Accord. 26 1 The destruction upon the civilian population of the
FRY was immense. 2 62 Over 120,000 buildings were razed and 25
percent of all Yugoslav schools were destroyed. 2 6 3 The number of
civilians without shelter rose to as high as 500,000 and 40,000
mines lay scattered throughout the FRY.264 Widespread
confusion gripped the province - everything from the legal code
to property rights was in disarray. 26 5 The majority of criminal
spending due to the war in Kosovo); Graham Stewart, Pedallinginto Politics, SPECTATOR,
Sept. 21, 2002, available at 2002 WL 14839063 (stating that some have asserted that the
military-industrial complex controlling the Pentagon was behind the Kosovo bombing
campaign); Nicholas Watts & Dan Atkinson, Making a Killing on the Cash Front Conflict
Winners: How the Arms Manufacturers, Profiteers and Contractors Enjoy Rich Pickings,
GUARDIAN, May 22, 1999, at 6 (indicating that the war in Kosovo represented an increase
of $15 billion in military spending and $20 billion in construction contracts).
260 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 106 (positing "there were, in fact, many war-making
interests that converged here: the need to invent a new role for NATO after the Cold War,
arms manufacturers' profits, a good place to test weapons, lucrative reconstruction
contracts..."); see also Nanda, supra note 10, at 19 (concluding "there are serious
questions about the validity of NATO's 'humanitarian intervention' in Kosovo under
international law"); Wippman, supra note 6, at 140 (noting "critics of NATO's intervention
even question whether NATO acted out of humanitarian motives, and whether it in fact
achieved humanitarian ends").
261 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 389-90 (stating the Kosovo Peace Accord ended the
bombing); Ian Fisher and Marlene Simons, U.N. Details Vicious Acts Charged Against
Milosevic, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at A6 (explaining the bombing began in March 1999
and ended in June of that year); see also Ian Fisher, Trial of Milosevic Will Peel Layers of
Balkan Guilt, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002, at Al (noting Serbian forces withdrew from
Bosnia in June 1999).
262 See Falk, supra note 17, at 851-52 (claiming the bombing campaign caused
hundreds, if not thousands of deaths among civilians); Voon, supra note 162, at 1085
(noting approximately 500 confirmed deaths and 6,000 injuries due to the bombing); see
also Lippman, supra note 205, at 49-50 (discussing the civilian deaths caused by the
bombing of Korisa).
263 Kosovo: An Uneasy Peace: Reconstruction, BBC News, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in-deptheurope/2000/uneasy-peace/reconstruction.
stm (last visited Mar. 21, 2003); see also Falk, supra note 17, at 851 (recognizing "the
bombing campaign resulted in heavy damage to the water supply and electricity systems;
caused severe pollution through the destruction of chemical factories and oil
refineries..."); Petar Teofilovic, Crisis in Yugoslav Public Law, 6 ANN. SURV. INT'L &
COMP. L. 71, 93 (2000) (stating "NATO's aggression resulted in massive destruction all
over Yugoslavia-its infrastructure (bridges, roads, heating and electricity plants,
networks for distribution of drinking water, homes) was devastated, numerous industrial
plants of all kinds ... were obliterated or heavily damaged").
264 Kosovo, An Uneasy Peace: Reconstruction, supra note 263; see Falk, supra note 17,
at 851 (noting the bombing induced a migration of refugees that approached one million);
see also McDonnell, supra note 126, at 59 (discussing casualties during and after the war
from minefields and unexploded cluster bombs).
265 See
Kosovo,
An
Uneasy Peace: Law
and Order, available at
http://news.bbc.co.ukhi/english/static/ in-deptheurope/2000/uneasy-peace/ law.order.stm
(last visited Mar. 22, 2003) (noting "[t]here is confusion over the legal code and no
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suspects were immediately released or disappeared after
arrest. 2 6 6 The BBC accused police and judges of bias, as they
have been unwilling to arrest ethnic Albanians or put them in
jail. 26 7 There have also been incidents of reprisals against NATO
troops by Albanians as they have become frustrated by the
realization that NATO is not willing to hand them independence
from the FRY.268 The senior UN official in Kosovo, Bernard
Kouchner, complained about insufficient humanitarian funding
to pay the salaries of essential workers like doctors and
teachers. 2 69
functioning judiciary"); Irene Scharf, Kosovo's War Victims: Civil Compensation or
Criminal Justice for Identity Elimination?, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1415, 1422 (2000)
(arguing "the province of Kosovo has neither police nor the legal institutions necessary for
a functioning justice system"); Edwin Villmoare, Ethnic Crimes and UN Justice in Kosovo:
The Trial of Igor Simic, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 373, 384 (2002) (arguing "[t]he entire Kosovo
legal system stands in disarray").
266 See Kosovo, An Uneasy Peace: Law and Order, supra note 265 (noting both
widespread crime and release of suspects after arrest); see also Paul Watson, Kosovo
Justice System Tries Patience of Serbs, Albanians, L. A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2000, at (stating
"both Serbs and ethnic Albanians are accusing its criminal courts of excessive delays, bias
among judges, widespread witness tampering and other serious violations of the right to a
fair trial"); SerbiaInfo, Detained ethnic Albanians released, at http://www.serbiainfo.comlnews/2001-05/11/23437.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2003) (discussing the release of
forty-two ethnic Albanians after an investigated judge allowed a stipulated time to
prosecute to lapse).
267 See Emma Batha, Kosovo: What happened to peace?, BBC News, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/655591.stm (Feb. 25 2000) (asserting "there are
accusations of bias as police have appeared reluctant to arrest ethnic Albanians and
judges will not put them behind bars"); see also Darryl A. Mundis, Current Development:
New Mechanisms for the Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law, 95 AM.
.J.INT'L.L. 934, 952 (2001) (suggesting "[i]nternational prosecutors will meet with
tremendous pressure to prosecute Kosovo Albanians for crimes committed against Kosovo
Serbs in that province, as well as local resistance to any such trials"); Scharf, supra note
265, at 1422 (explaining "[jiustice is hard to come by, and the province of Kosovo has
neither police nor the legal institutions necessary for a functioning justice system").
268 See Batha, supra note 267 (noting "[s]ome analysts fear that when Kosovo's
Albanians realise the UN is not about to hand them independence on a plate, they will
turn their firepower on the peacekeepers"); French Soldiers Kill Sniper in Mitrovica, at
http://www.rte.ie/news/2000/0213/kosovo.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (discussing
French peacekeeping forces' response to Albanian sniper fire); see also British troops kill
two ethnic Albanians as tensions rise, at http://www.ardmoreite.comlstories/070499/newgree.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (recognizing rising tensions after an altercation
between British troops and ethnic Albanians).
269 See
Rocket
Attack
on
Serb
Bus,
BBC
News,
available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/628880.stm (Feb. 3 2000) (stating that many in
the West believed the problems to be over at the end of the war, ignoring that very
difficult logistical problems would arise with the peacekeeping efforts); see also
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography Report, Humanitariansituation of
the Kosovo refugees and displacedpersons, at http://assembly.coe.int/DocumentsAVorking
Docsldoc99/ edoc8392.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (suggesting "emergency relief should
be followed up by financial assistance from the international community on a huge scale
both for reconstruction and rehabilitation in Kosovo"); Jerry White, UN relief agencies
warn of humanitarian disaster in Yugoslavia, at http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/
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A. Reverse Ethnic Cleansing
The NATO bombing succeeded in securing the return of all but
35,000 of the 800,000 Albanian refugees. 2 70 There was, however,
an exodus of half of Kosovo's Serb population after NATO's
bombs ceased. 27 1 Over 200,000 Serbs are still abroad and those
that remain in Kosovo are the targets of violence and often
murder from revenge attack by Albanians. 2 72 NATO leadership
has pleaded with the remaining Serbs not to flee Kosovo, but KFOR's273 commander has admitted that his troops have not done
enough to protect the remaining Serbs in the province. 2 74 The
sdis.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (discussing the widespread destruction in Serbia due
to the conflicts as well as NATO bombing).
270 Kosovo: An Uneasy Peace, Refugees, BBC News, availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/
hilenglish/static/indepth/europe/2000/uneasypeace/refugees.stm
(last visited Apr. 3,
2003).
271 See Medenica, supra note 5, at 342 (asserting "[a]pproximately half the Serb
population has reportedly fled since the NATO bombing began"); Kosovo: An Uneasy
Peace, Refugees, supra note 270 (recognizing "since [Albanian refugees] began returning
last summer, at least 200,000 Kosovo Serbs have left the province fearing retaliatory
attacks"); N[ATO]'s Children in Kosovo, at http://www.balkanpeace.orghed/archive/june
01hed3425.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (arguing "[slince Nato's takeover of Kosovo
some 180,000 Serbs have fled their homes. Their flight has received little media attention.
The 100,000 or so who have stayed live in enclaves dotted around the land, guarded by KFor troops").
272 See Kosovo: An Uneasy Peace, Refugees, supra note 270 (explaining the Serbs who
remain in Kosovo are frequently victimized by retaliatory strikes); see also Paul
Anderson, Eyewitness: Kosovo Serbs Living in Fear, BBC News available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2fhi/europe/1180310.stm (Feb. 20, 2001) (discussing claims of
Albanian attacks on Serb policemen and civilians); Nick Wood, Serbs Killed in Kosovo
Village, BBC News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2Ihi/europe/1194036.stm (Feb. 28,
2001) (recognizing "[tihe UN administration in Kosovo fears more attacks on the
province's Serbian minority could follow unless a peaceful solution to.the crisis is found");
Gabriel
Partos, Analysis: Serbs
Under Fire, BBC
News,
available at
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhi/europe/784005.stm (June 9, 2000) (suggesting 100,000 Serbs
and tens of thousands of other refugees fled Albanian attacks after the end of the NATO
bombing campaign).
273 See Kosovo Force, at http://www.nato.intkfor/kfor/about.htm (last visited Apr. 3,
2003) (explaining "[t]he Kosovo Force (KFOR) is a NATO-led international force
responsible for establishing and maintaining security in Kosovo"); Now Kosovo Albanians
want K-FOR out, BBC News, availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/810550.
stm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (defining 'K-FOR' as a NATO-backed peacekeeping force);
see also Deadline today for KLA to disarm and disband in Kosovo, ABC News, availableat
http://www.abc.net.au/newskosovo/kosovo-20sep1999-1.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003)
(discussing a K-FOR deadline for the KLA to disarm and disband).
274 See Kosovo: Special Report, Serbs Flee, BBC News,
available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/nato-gallery/serbsflee default.stm (last visited Apr.
3, 2003) (noting the commander's admission that his troops did not do enough to prevent
an attack on a Serb home); see also Cynthia Long, Thousands of Ethnic Albanians Pour
Into Kosovo as Serbs Flee, at http://www.disasterrelief.org/Disasters/990617Kosovo16/
indextxt.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (explaining "NATO peacekeeping forces have
assured the Serbs that they will be protected and that KLA rebel forces will be forced to
turn over their weapons, but the Serbs continue to flee"); Laura R. Palmer, A Very Clear
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process by which most Serbs have been expelled from Kosovo
after the bombing and the failed efforts of peacekeepers to
prevent their exodus has been called a "reverse ethnic
cleansing."275 This is a serious failure of the international
community and particularly NATO. NATO deployed less than
half of the police force it had promised to prevent violence in the
aftermath of the bombing and NATO governments have been
unwilling to provide the funding or the necessary peacekeeping
troops. 27 6 What is particularly surprising is that NATO has
allowed members of the KLA, which had been deemed a terrorist
organization by most of the West, 2 77 to disband into a civilian
police force (now the TMK), despite the fact that the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe has held
the KLA responsible for most of the revenge killings against the
Serbs.

27 8

Questions also emerged about the nature of the refugee crisis
both before and after the bombing. Many analysts accused
and Present Danger: Hate Speech, Media Reform, and Post-Conflict Democratization in
Kosovo, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 179, 183 (2001) (noting "a recent statement by nearly eighty
international non-governmental organizations operating in Kosovo reports that interethnic harassment, intimidation, bombings, arson, drive-by shootings, kidnappings and
murder all continue, despite the province's status as an international protectorate").
275 See Bilder, supra note 166, at 176 (suggesting "the lesson may be rather, make
sure you are on the winning side, or at least have powerful friends"); see also Falk, supra
note 17, at 852 (noting "[a] related criticism is that the severity of NATO's strategy,
combined with the Serb responses to it, produced a set of circumstances that has resulted
in a reverse process of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo"). See generally Sergio Balanzino,
NATO's Actions to Uphold Human Rights and Democratic Values in Kosovo:A Test Case
for a New Alliance, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 364, 372 (1999) (arguing "[t]he ethnic cleansing
of the Kosovar Albanians had been reversed even if the NATO forces in Kosovo faced a
new challenge of protecting the Serb and other minorities remaining in Kosovo").
276 See The World Today, ABC News Online, availableat http://www.abc.net.au/world
today/s31678.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (arguing "KFOR numbers are still well short
of what's needed and its soldiers are not particularly well equipped for the main task:
policing"); see also Serbs Flee, supra note 274 (recognizing the Serbian refugees' fears of
retaliation by the KLA); The UN in Kosovo: The Potential for Justice, available at
http://www.csis.org/pubs/prospectus/00springSchultz.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003)
(noting "the lack of funding directed towards both security and law and order").
277 See supra note 86.
278 See Alice
Mahon,
KLA
Spread Wave of Violence, available at
http://www.poptel.org.uk/scgn/articles/0103/page8.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003) (claiming
"[flor almost two years, the international community has acquiesced in - and sometimes
even assisted a campaign of terror and ethnic cleansing by the KLA"); Kosovo: An Uneasy
Peace, Demilitarisation,BBC News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/indepthleurope/2000/uneasy-peace/demilitarisation.stm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003) (stating
that human rights workers have accused the UN of being to lenient towards former KLA
members); The US, the KLA and ethnic cleansing,availableat http://www.wsws.org/
articles/1999/jun1999/koso-j29_prn.shtml (last visited Apr. 4, 2003) (discussing KLA
attacks on Serb villages and an apparent lack of UN intervention).
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NATO of precipitating the greater part of the refugee crisis. 2 7 9
There is at least compelling evidence that the refugee crisis
dramatically increased the night the first NATO bombs fell.280
U.S.-NATO Commanding General Wesley Clark stated that it
was "entirely predictable" that Serb violence would intensify
after the bombing. 2 81 After the dramatic increase in the number
of refugees after the bombing began, Clark stated that this did
not surprise him: "[t]he military authorities fully anticipated the
vicious approach that Milosevic would adopt, as well as the
terrible efficient with which he would carry it Out." 28 2

VII. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: KOSOVO AS
PRECEDENT?

If NATO abided by established international law and the
guidelines for military intervention under the U.N. Charter,
there would have been no bombing. 283 Only by acting outside of
the Charter could action be taken against the FRY. Does this
mean that the Charter provisions are inadequate as a framework
for the 21st century?
Some scholars suggest that the veto
paralysis of the U.N. Security Council and its monopoly on the
use of force make it a flawed foundation for the future. 28 4 These
279 See Voon, supra note 95, at 90-91 (asserting the NATO bombing precipitated the
refugee catastrophe); see also Bilder, supra note 166, at 170 (stating NATO was aware the
bombing would create a refugee crisis). But see Could it Have Been Done Better?, Kosovo
Crisis, available at http://www.nato.intlkosovo/repo2000lbetter.htm (last visited Apr. 4,
2003) (asserting "[s]ome claim the brutal ethnic cleansing, violence and refugee exodus
was precipitated by NATO's air campaign. The facts do not support this").
280 See Wippman, supra note 6, at 134 (stating that the greater part of the exodus when 800,000 Albanians were forced to flee Kosovo and as many as 10,000 were killed did not occur until after the bombing began); see also Bilder, supra note 166, at 170
(explaining NATO's greatest fear was that the bombing would deteriorate the refugee
situation). See generally Brigadier General Daniel P. Leaf, NATO's Role In Kosovo, Press
Conference, at http://www.nato.intIkosovo/press/p990419b.htm (Apr. 19, 1999) (recounting
observations during a bombing sortie in Kosovo in which houses were being set ablaze on
the ground by a convoy of vehicles and civilian refugees were inadvertently killed by
NATO bombing).
281 See Chomsky, supra note 17, at 20 (quoting Commanding General Wesley Clark's
announcement that violence would increase after the bombing); see also Bilder, supra note
166, at 170 (quoting Special Envoy Holbrooke as saying that NATO's greatest fear was
that the bombing would deteriorate the refugee situation). See generally Leaf, supra note
280 (describing the general chaos that ensued during the bombing campaign).
282 Chomsky, supra note 17, at 21.
283 See Stannard, supra note 69, at 619 (alleging NATO's actions violated the laws of
war); see also Schwabach, supra note 6, at 405 (questioning the legality of NATO's
bombing). See generally U.N. CHARTER pmbl. (setting forth the United Nations
international agreements).
284 See Kai Ambros, Comment, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects,
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scholars view Kosovo as a turning point in international affairs,
the beginning of a New International Order where morality, not
sovereignty, is the preeminent principle. 28 5 They argue that the
Charter, with its archaic principle of sovereignty, has become
inadequate and organizations such as NATO should be free to
use force to carry our international justice. 28 6 Normative
developments such as globalization, the spread of democracy, and
instantaneous
media
coverage
have eroded
"domestic
jurisdiction" and have made events anywhere in the world
everyone's concern. 28 7 This view holds that:
[T]he organization in danger of sliding into irrelevance
seems to be not NATO but the United Nations. In a political
variant of free-market competition, the U.N. Security
Council risks disappearing as a serious security body as the
genuinely powerful prefer to work through a more
convenient instrument. All that the Security Council can
offer is "legitimacy," in the view of some Western
governments - and NATO may provide the desired
multilateral cover, with less obstruction. 28 8
I believe the advocates of this New International Order fail to
take into account the many dangers of casting aside the U.N.
EURO. J. INT'L L., available at http://www.ejil.org/journalVollO/Nol/coma.html (last
modified June 23, 1999) (describing the affect of the veto power in a variety of contexts);
see also Doctors without Borders, SC Veto Power Hindering Protection of Civilians,
Humanitarian Aid Must Not Be Subordinate to Political Objectives, available at
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/pr/2000/04-12-2000.shtml
(Apr.
12,
2000)
(outlining how Security Council's veto power interferes with humanitarian causes); World
Federalist
Association,
Reform
of
UN Decision Making Structures, at
http://www.endgenocide.org/ceg-dms/ (stating "[iut is neither morally right or politically
sensible to leave veto power in the Security Council in the hands of the five nuclear
powers").
285 See Ambros, supra note 284 (noting the change in international law); see also
Charney, supra note 11, at 1239-40 (asserting that the Kosovo intervention is perhaps the
birth of a new international law from state practice); Stannard, supra note 69, at 619
(stating that "[i]t has been stated that this war was waged, not "in the name of national
interests, but rather in the name of principles and values").
286 See Charney, supra note 11, at 1244 (setting out the basis upon which regional
organizations, such as NATO, can resort to force when the U.N. fails to act); see also
Doctors without Borders, supra note 285, (describing how political motivations prevented
the UN from intervening in Rwanda). See generally U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
287 See Falk, supra note 17, at 853 (describing media's impact on politics); H.D.S.
Greenway, This Warring Century, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV. (Sept/Oct. 1999)
available at http://www.cjr.org/year/99/5/war.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2003) (outlining
media coverage from WWI through Kosovo). But see Ji-Hyeon Seo, Media Coverage on the
War on Terrorism, available at http://www.aim.org/publicationsbriefings/2002/18feb2O02.
html (Feb. 18, 2002) (questioning accuracy of media coverage).
288 See Simma, supra note 38 (quoting the United Nations Association of the U.S.A).
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framework that I have laid out above. Foremost, this New
Interventionism has no well-defined limitations. 289 The Kosovo
experience was an ad hoc approach instead of a clear set of rules
for action and deliberation. 2 90 The Western countries of NATO
decided that Kosovo was a situation that demanded military
intervention and they used force without Security Council
authorization. 29 1 Logically, the question must be asked: who else
can decide when and where to use force for humanitarian ends?
May other regional groups besides NATO assert their right of
humanitarian intervention in contravention of the U.N. Charter?
One could hardly conceive of the West allowing the Arab League
to attack Israel to protect Palestinian civilians because in their
view atrocities were being committed. Would the United States
allow China to bomb Jakarta to prevent Indonesia's
mistreatment of its Chinese minority? 292 Yet, once we step
outside of the U.N. framework there is nothing to prevent the
293
anarchic situation that would result.

Neither can the U.N. Security Council's veto system be
considered a stalling device. 294 The likely vetoes from Russia and
289 See Charney, supra note 11, at 1247 (discussing how NATO's action was not
narrowly tailored in Kosovo); See also Statement of H. Rep.Adam Schiff, available at
http://www.house.gov/schiffloped-iraq.htm (Oct. 8, 2002) (discussing the danger of
intervention in Iraq without support from the international community). See generally
George Washington's FarewellAddress, available at http://www.civnet.org/resources/teach
fbasic/part8/49.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003) (warning us to avoid the entangling
alliances).
290 See Charney, supra note 11 at 48-49 (stating that the Kosovo intervention
displays the dangers of asserting an undeveloped rule of law); see also Amnesty
International,
NATO
broke
rules
of
war
in
Kosovo
campaign,
at
http://www.balkanpeace.org/hed/archive/juneOOfhedl90.shtml (last visited Sept. 9, 2003)
(claiming NATO bombing actually violated laws of war).
291 See Voon, supra note 95, at 34 (noting the Kosovo War was fought in the absence
of Security Council authorization); see also Richard J. Goldstone, Whither Kosovo?
Whither democracy? Global Insights, 8 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, Apr.1, 2002, at 143
(concluding that, "in the absence of United Nations Security Council authorization, the
NATO military response violated international law but was nonetheless politically and
morally legitimate").
292 See Wippman, supra note 6, at 135 (positing these hypotheticals); see also Bilder,
supra note 166, at 162-63 (questioning whether this expanded interventionist policy could
invoke action in other contexts); Ambros, supra note 284 (suggesting we may have opened
Pandora's box by breaking rules).
293 See Bilder supra note 166, at 63 (questioning the U.N.'s ability to uphold its rules
in light of NATO's actions); see also Charney, supra note 11, at 1248 (stating that the
Kosovo precedent is dangerous because it would allow powerful states to use for in
violation of international law); Gerson, supra note 15, at 15 (stating power politics would
be the norm if the U.N. international framework is not adhered to).
294 See Schwabach, supra note 6, at 407-08 (explaining how NATO and the US
justified circumventing the U.N. by saying Russia and China's veto power was standing in
the way of proper intervention in Kosovo); see also Ambros, supra note 284 (suggesting to
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China cannot be considered a failure of the U.N. system. 2 95 The
U.N. is pluralistic system where all countries have a voice in the
international political process regardless of their economic and
military power.
Citizens of Russia and China represent a
significant percentage of the world's population, and if India's
opposition to the war is included, representatives of more than
half the world's population opposed NATO's intervention. 2 96
Thus, NATO's contention that it acted on the part of the
international community when it took up arms against the FRY
is mere hyperbole. 29 7
CONCLUSION

The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia is a defining event in the
future of international affairs. The failures of the war in Kosovo
should reaffirm the principles of the U.N. Charter, which
although imperfect, is the most widely accepted international
instrument for the maintenance of peace. Nations should not shy
away from troubled regions, but rather work within the
procedures of the U.N. to negotiate peaceful solutions to
remove veto power of the permanent Security Council Members to make way for new
interventions); Doctors without Borders, supra note 284 (advocating the removal of
Security Council's veto power to clear the way for future humanitarian intervention);
World Federalist Association, Reform of UN Decision Making Structures, available at
http://www.endgenocide.org/ceg-dms/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2003) (stating "[iJt is neither
morally right or politically sensible to leave veto power in the Security Council in the
hands of the five nuclear powers").
295 Russia and China had a right to veto military action in Kosovo that was enshrined
in the U.N. Charter and wholly proper. See Schwabach, supra note 6, at 408. It is our
circumvention of the U.N. that is improper, not the veto power itself. There is such a
sense of our lawlessness that it was suggested France may not exercise its veto power in
the recent conflict in Iraq because they are aware it will be disregarded in any event. See
James S. Robbins, Will France Veto?, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Mar. 10, 2003. Frustrated with
not being able to wholly manipulate international law William F. Buckley has recently
suggested revamping the U.N. veto system or eliminating it altogether. See William F.
Buckley Jr., Who/What To Be Mad At, Vol. LV, NAT'L REV. 7 (Apr. 21, 2003).
296 Schwabach, supra note 6, at 417 (explaining that three of the world's most
populous countries, containing more than half the world's population condemned military
action in Kosovo); see Buckley supra note 295 (recognizing that India should be given veto
power if population were measured). But see James Kitfield, Why Nato's Credibility Is at
Stake, NAT'L J., Oct. 10, 1998, at 2381 (arguing the credibility of NATO would be damaged
if they could not provide stability as a result of a veto).
297 See generally Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, FOREIGN AFF.
AGENDA, The New Shape of World Politics: Contending Paradigms in International
Relations, 81 (1997) (stating that the term 'the world community' is a euphemism used to
provide legitimacy to actions reflecting the interest of Western powers); see also Chomsky,
supra note 17, at 139 (stating "international community" signifies rich industrial western
societies); Schwabach, supra note 6, at 417 (pointing out nearly half the world's
population condemned the action).
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international disputes. In this case, NATO should have offered
more lenient peace terms prior to entering into hostilities - such
as the terms that were actually accepted in the Kosovo Peace
Accord - in order to immediately place a U.N. peacekeeping force
on the ground. The use of force in contravention of the Charter
will only hinder the protection of international human rights.
The collateral consequences of NATO's intervention, including its
devastating impact on civilians, the environment, the
exacerbation of the refugee crisis and the ill-preparedness of
NATO to build local Kosovan institutions, show the aftereffects
endemic to the use of military force.
Some of the lessons of Kosovo seem to have changed the way
the Bush administration carried out the war in Iraq. For
example, in Iraq there was an immediate push to get troops on
the ground despite the obvious dangers to the military. There
was no prolonged air campaign in Iraq as in Kosovo. This change
in strategy may be due to the ineffectiveness of the seventy-eight
day bombing campaign in Kosovo, and an acknowledgment that a
sustained air campaign at 15,000 feet without ground troops
maximizes the dangers to civilians.
Furthermore, despite
ultimately acting outside the U.N. in using force against Iraq, the
Bush administration made a sustained effort to work within the
U.N., perhaps conceding the importance of working within this
body.
The recent events over Iraq also reveal a fragmentation of the
West, in contrast to its unity during the NATO campaign. In
Kosovo, there was no major dissent from any Western country
against using force on the FRY, despite the absence of Security
Council authorization. In the war in Iraq, on the other hand,
there was a glaring split between the U.S. and most of Europe on
the question of the use of force outside of the United Nations. In
the War on Terrorism, President Bush has reiterated that the
U.S. is prepared to use force to obtain its objectives, and the U.N.
Charter's prohibition on the use of force will not restrain the
U.S.'s freedom of action. This poses the question: Why are the
European powers now committed to handling international
crises, including Iraq, through the U.N.? Is this new emphasis
on the U.N. due to a perceived failure in Kosovo?
These
questions are increasingly important as the U.S. works to build a
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coalition in the War on Terrorism and possibly open new theaters
of war.

